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In general, experimental research on the effects of communica-
tions on opinion change has focussed on one or more of the following 
types of variables: the communicator, the communication process, the 
audience, and the socio-psychological context in which the communica-
tion occurs. It is obvious that these factors do not have their influ-
ence in isolation from each other, i.e. communicator credibility 
involves the audience's judgment of the communicator. Consequently, 
the evident complexity of the total influence process suggests the 
value of an approach which takes into consideration the inter-relation-
ships between these components. In this research, the simple and 
interactive effects of three particular factors relating to the 
communication process --- conclusion-drawing, communicator-credibi-
lity, and audience predisposition--- will be examined. 
Hovland and Mandell (6) have recently studied the relative 
effectiveness of communications whose facts and arguments are the same 
but whose issue-related conclusions are or are not explicitly stated. 
They suggest that the explicit communication ( that is, where the 
conclusion is stated explicitly ) might be more effective than the 
non-explicit ( where there is no explicit statement of the conclusion ) 
because for many members of the audience an explicit statement of the 
conclusion would be necessary in order to insure its being clearly 
perceived. They also suggest the possibility that the omission of an 
explicit statement of the conclusion might serve as a cue that the 
communicator had something to conceal, and, therefore, an explicit 
statement of the conclusion might be more effective. On the other 
hand, these authors feel that greater effectiveness for the non-
explicit communication might be expected because of the assertion 
sometimes made that indirect suggestion is more effective than 
direct. In support of such a prediction, they cite further the 
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"tenet" of the nondirective school of psychotherapy that decisions 
arrived at independently by the client are more "effective" than when 
such decisions are suggested by the therapist. Hovland and Mandell's 
experimental data indicate that the explicit communication was more 
effective than the non-explicit in stimulating opinion change on the 
topic of the communication. However, Thistlethwaite, de Haan and 
Kamenetzky (19) suggest that Hovland and Mandell's results were 
complicated by their confounding of "comprehension" and "acceptance" 
of the communicator's conclusion; that is, greater opinion change 
(acceptance) might be associated with the explicit communication 
primarily because it produced superior comprehension of the communica-
tor's position. These researchers demonstrate that the explicit commu-
nication does produce superior comprehension of the communicator's 
position. Despite this, they found that opinion change was not 
differentially affected by the explicit or non-explicit procedures 
either when all the Ss were utilized in the comparisons or when only 
those Ss who had comprehended the communicator's conclusion were 
compared. Their implication that comprehension is related to opinion 
change is not directly tested; that is, they do not compare the opinion 
changes of the Ss who did and who did not come to the appropriate 
cone lusion. 
The inconsistency between the results of Hovland and Mandell and 
those of Thistlethwaite, de Haan and Kamenetzky may possibly be due 
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to differences in communication structure and content and differences 
in the importance of the content to the communicatees. Hovland and 
Mandell employed a technique of communication organization and struc-
ture which was similar to the "symptom and diagnosis" problem found 
in medicine. The general principles of the topic were presented along 
with a statement of existing conditions so that conclusion-drawing 
consisted essentially of fitting the particulars and the generaliza-
tions together to determine the appropriate implications. Thistle-
thwaite, de Haan and Kamenetzky, on the other hand, employed the more 
conventional "pro-con" type of communication organization in which the 
communicator sets up "straw men" and then proceeds to knock them down 
with a convincing argument. While neither of the two experiments 
obtained any measures of the importance of the communication topic 
to the audience, an examination of the subject matter of each communi-
cation indicates that differences between the two experiments in 
importance of the topic to the audience might be expected. Hovland 
and Mandell's topic of devaluation of the dollar in the United States 
might have been less important to their introductory psychology 
student-subjects than was Thistlethwaite, de Haan and Kamenetzky's 
topic on the Korean War to their military subjects. In any event, 
the differences between the two studies, both in regard to results and 
procedure, suggests the need for further research in the area. 
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An important variable related to conclusion-drawing is that of 
communicator-credibility. While there are many studies dealing with 
this variable (4,7,12,21), only Hovland and Mandell have explored its 
interaction with conclusion-drawing. They predicted that a non-credible 
communicator would be more effective using a non-explicit communication 
than he would be using an explicit communication and that a credible 
communicator would be more effective using an explicit communication 
than he would be using a non-explicit one. Their results do not confirm 
the presence of such an interaction between source credibility and con-
clusion-drawing. They point out, however, that their method for induc-
ing differential source credibility might not have resulted in suffici-
ently disparate impressions of the trustworthiness of the source. Con-
sequently, the effectiveness of this factor should be re-examined. 
In a consideration of opinion change, attention should also be given 
to predispositional factors in the communicatees. While much can be 
learned about opinion change from a consideration of various aspects 
of the communication, the communicator and the situation in which the 
communication process takes place, one must turn ultimately to the 
communicatee in order to obtain a more complete picture of the opinion 
change process for it is within him that the change process occurs and 
through his behavior that the change is measured. 
Previous research indicates the influence of such predispositions! 
factors in communication effectiveness as initial position (5,11,14,19), 
induced motivation (10,23) and personality attributes of the communica-
tees (8,10,22). The present research examines both initial position 
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and anxiety as predispositional factors interacting with the main 
variables of conclusion-drawing and source credibility. Audience 
anxiety has been shown to be of importance in the opinion change 
process under certain conditions (8,9,10,11). It is examined here in 
its relationship with an anxiety-allaying communication. 
The current research was designed to test the following hyptheses 
regarding the interaction of conclusion-drawing, communicator credibi-
lity, initial opinion and anxiety. In order to do this, several 
assumptions were made. 
The first assumption is that the greater the discrepancy between 
the S's position and the communicator's position, the greater will be 
the S's resistance to opinion change. 
A second assumption is that the more clearly stated the communica-
tor's position is, the more obvious the discrepancy between the S and 
the communicator will be.* 
Consequently, it would be expected that the Ss initially opposed 
to the communicator's position will be more influenced by the non-
explicit communication than by the explicit. In the non-explicit condi-
tion there is less likelihood that either of the two factors which lead 
to resistance to the impact of the communication will be involved. That 
is, in this condition, the Swill be less certain of the communicator's 
position and less aware of the communicator's attempt to persuade him 
* Also, the more clearly stated the communicator's position is, the more 
obvious should be his attempt to persuade the S to adopt a particular 
position. This should also arouse the S's motivation to reject the commu-
nicator's attempt at opinion change. 
7 
to adopt a particular position than in the explicit condition. 
It is expected that the Ss initially favorable toward the communi-
cator's position will be more influenced by the explicit communication 
than by the non-explicit. This expectation is based on the assumption 
that although the effects of increased awareness of discrepancy are 
still operative, the discrepancy is much smaller than in the case of 
the unfavorably disposed Ss and should have less of an effect on opinions 
than the strong counter-effect of a clearly stated, well-defined posi-
tion. 
With regard to credibility, it is expected that in the non-credible 
condition, the non-explicit communication will be more effective than 
the explicit communication in changing opinions. The basis for this 
prediction rests on the assumption that there is a tendency to resist 
persuasion by non-credible sources, and the explicit condition serves 
to make the persuasive position of the non-credible source more evident, 
thus heightening this tendency to resist. 
As for the credible condition, it is expected that the explicit 
communication will be more effective than the non-explicit, since a 
trustworthy source should make the S more inclined to be influenced by 
a communication and since the explicit conmunication more clearly 
emphasizes the communicator's position. 
Viewing anxiety as a response predisposition, it is expected that 
the Ss who are high in anxiety will be more likely to accept a communi-
cation than the Ss who are low in anxiety when the viewpoint of the 
communication is both anxiety-allaying and congruent with the response 
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predisposition. The theoretical statement underlying this prediction 
asserts that communication effectiveness is facilitated when congruency 
exists between response predispositions of the communicatees and the 
communication appeals (22,23). 
With regard to anxiety in interaction with conclusion-drawing, 
it is apparent that in the explicit condition the communicator's posi-
tion is clearer and noted as the appropriate position. In an anxiety-
allaying communication, an explicit statement of the conclusion should 
be more effective in allaying anxiety and, therefore, more effective 
in changing opinions of the high anxious Ss than the non-explicit 
condition should be. 
For those Ss who are low in anxiety, the factor of the allaying 
of anxiety will not be as important. However, more widespread know-
ledge of the appropriate, reasonable conclusion will lead to greater 
effectiveness of the explicit communication than of the non-explicit 
one. The difference in opinion change between high anxious Ss in the 
explicit condition and high anxious Ss in the non-explicit condition 
should be greater than the difference between the low anxious Ss in the 
explicit condition and the low anxious Ss in the non-explicit condition 
due to the greater anxiety-allaying effect of the communication among 
the high anxious Ss. 
Finally, it is important to obtain delayed measures of opinion 
change. To say that a given communication is effective in changing 
opinions as measured immediately after exposure to that communication 
is, of course, meaningful and of importance. But to base any program 
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of persuasive communication upon the assumption that the effectiveness 
of the given communication will persist can be extremely misleading. 
This has been shown to be true in several opinion change experiments 
using delayed measures (7,12,2l).These studies have shown that in terms 
of immediate opinion change, high credibility sources are somewhat 
more effective than low credibility sources. Delayed measures of 
opinion change indicated that this differential effectiveness had 




A before---immediate-after---delayed-after design was employed. The 
before opinion questionnaire contained four questions on the topic of 
biological warfare, a variety of filler questions, and two anxiety-
assessing inventories. Three weeks later all of the Ss read an article 
about biological warfare. The article, in attractive booklet form, 
focussed on the proposition that biological warfare was not a "super" 
weapon and that it could be defended against by the United States. One 
half of the Ss read a version of the article in which this proposition 
was stated explicitly as the appropriate conclusion; the other half 
read a version which was devoid of any explicit statement of the con-
clusion. Also, for one half of each group, the authorship of the article 
was attributed to a credible source and for the other half to a non-
credible source. Immediately after reading the article, the Ss filled 
out an extensive opinion questionnaire containing opinion questions 
on biological warfare, judgmental items concerning the article and. the 
source, and a series of items testing the Ss' acquisition of the content 
of the article. Six weeks later all the Ss filled out an identical 
opinion questionnaire. A control group, that was not exposed to the 
experimental communications, but responded to appropriate questionnaires 
at the same times as the experimental groups, was also employed. 
Before measures 
The before questionnaire was presented to the Ss for the ostensible 
purpose of ascertaining their opinions on a variety of topics. The Ss 
were informed that the questionnaire was part of a survey being conducted 
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by a national research organization for the purpose of comparing 
opinions of representative college stuients with those of the general 
public on a number of issues. The questionnaires, printed by the photo-
offset method on high grade bond paper to give them an "official" 
appearance, were administered by faculty members to their own classes. 
The questionnaire contained four opinion items on the topic of 
biological warfare in addition to a large number of "filler" items on 
a number of unrelated opinion issues. All items were multiple-choice 
in form, each containing five or more response categories {see appen-
dix A). Also included were 20 items from the Taylor Manifest Anxiety 
Seale and 10 specially prepared items relating to the Ss concern about 
war. The 20 Taylor items were indicated by Bechtoldt* as being the most 
discriminating ones from the full 50 item Taylor Scale. A true-false 
dichotomy was employed for the anxiety-assessing items with the S 
signifying "true" if the assertion applied to himself and "false" if 
it did not. These items were presented as a unit in the form of a 
"personal inventory" and followed, in order, the general opinion ques-
tions. The before measures also obtained information about the S's age, 
sex, class, veteran status and place and date of birth. No names or 
personal identification were requested. The anonymity of the question-
naire was stressed throughout. 
Experimental communication and after measures 
Approximately three weeks later an article on biological warfare 
* personal communication 
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was presented to the Ss as part of a study by the Division of Research 
of Boston University. The Ss were told that the purpose of the study 
was to find out how well people learn from newspaper articles. 
The communication, based on a Civil Defense pamphlet, attempted to 
put forth the point of view that biological warfare is not a "super" 
weapon and that we in the United States can defend against it. The 
logical form of the communication employed by Hovland and Mandell (6) 
was adopted in the construction of the communication. That is, the 
major problem was stated; "biological warfare" and "super" weapon were 
defined; the similarity of biological attacks to the ordinary spread 
of disease was noted; and conditions in two countries with respect to 
their ability to handle disease were compared, with one country being 
presented as very efficient in coping with epidemics, etc., and the 
otll<er country as very ineffective. 
In the explicit version, the final paragraph of the communication 
contained a statement of the conclusion that since the U.S. is even 
better prepared than the "efficient" country, biological warfare is not 
a "super" weapon for us; we in the United States can defend against it. 
The non-explicit version did not have this conclusion stated in the 
final paragraph. Instead, the Ss were urged to draw their own conclusion 
on the basis of the arguments presented in the article. The two communi-
cations differed in no way except for the last paragraph. (see appendix B). 
The communication was the end result of an extensive series of 
pre-tests. The major concern in its development was to make sure that, 
while both the explicit and the non-explicit forms contained the exact 
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same facts and information, the Ss reading the non-explicit form 
would have a sufficient basis for arriving at the "correct" conclusion 
as it was stated in the explicit form. And, furthermore, this inference 
should be neither too obvious nor too difficult to make. 
One half of the Ss read the explicit communication and one half 
read the non-explicit communication. One half of the Ss in each of 
these groups had the authorship of their article attributed to a 
credible source, the New York Times. The other half of the Ss in each 
group had the authorship of their article attributed to a non-credible 
source, the Daily Worker. The name of the source was mentioned both at 
the beginning and at the end of each article. For the Daily Worker, 
the additional explanatory phrase "official newspaper of the Communist 
Party in the United States" was appended at the beginning of the article. 
For the New York Times, the descriptive phrase "one of the most widely 
read newspapers in the U.S." •as added. ( see appendix B ). 
The four forms of the communication ( conclusion-drawing X credi-
bility) were prepared in booklet form. They were distributed in accord-
ance with a sequence of 4 x 4 Latin Squares so that no two adjacent Ss 
would be assigned to the same experimental condition. The Ss were in-
forJned that they were reading articles on a variety of topics taken 
from a number of different newspapers. This was done to allay any 
suspicions that might have been aroused in the Ss by virtue of their 
having "peeked" at their neighbor's booklet and noticed that his 
communication was from a different source than was their own. 
The communications and immediate-after questionnaires •ere passed 
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out together. The questionnaires were sealed to prevent ''peeking" and 
were pre-coded as to experimental condition. 
The Ss were allowed 10 minutes for reading the articles; this was 
ample time for everyone. Then, the communication booklets were collected 
and the Ss were told to fill out the opinion questionnaires. 
The first question in the immediate-after questionnaire 
( see appendix C ) was an open-ended question which asked the S to 
state what he thought was the main position of the communicator. This 
was followed by a series of multiple-choice questions on the obvious-
ness of this attributed conclusion, and on the Ss' judgments of the 
quality of the article, the fairness of the presentation, the interest 
level of the article, and the propagandistic intent of the author. 
Following these were a series of opinion items on biological warfare; 
they were the same four items that had appeared on the before question-
naire. Next were a series of six multiple-choice items testing the Ss' 
retention of the content of the article, an open-ended question on 
recall of source and a few questions pertinent to the Ss' concern 
about biological warfare. Personal background data were also requested. 
The background data and handwriting were used to facilitate matching 
the Ss' before and after questionnaires. 
Six weeks later the Ss were presented with the identical question-
naire ( see appendix D ) with the explanation that the Division of 
Research was now interested in finding out what people remembered about 
the ... newspaper articles they had read six weeks ago. After these question-
naires were collected, the Ss were informed of the true nature of the 
experiment. 
Contro 1 group 
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This group consisted of approximately 40 students who were not 
exposed to the communications, but who completed appropriate question-
naires at the same times as the experimental groups. The control group 
vas a single class used as a unit. 
Subjects 
Approximately 400 students, predominately freshman, at American 
International College, Springfield, Massachusetts, were utilized. The 
research was carried out in regularly scheduled class meetings in 
various psychology courses. The two faculty members in whose classes 
the experiment was carried out assisted in certain aspects of the 
experiment. 
Scoring 
The items on biological warfare were scored by a three-point system. 
A response to an opinion item whose sense indicated that the U.S. could 
defend itself adequately against biological warfare or that biological 
warfare vas not a 11 super 11 weapon, was assigned a score of one. The 
selection of the "uncertain" category received a score of two. When the 
response indicated the opinion that the U.S. could not defend against 
biological warfare or that biological warfare .!.!!:,! a "super" weapon, a 
score of three was assigned. The scores on the four opinion items were 
summated for each S for each time period. The theoretical range of 
total scores for each time period was from 4 to 12. To exhibit change 
of opinion from one time period to another, an opinion change score was 
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employed; that is, changes in total scores between any two time periods 
were computed for each S. A plus change score indicated that the S had 
changed toward greater acceptance of the position that biological war-
fare was a "super" weapon and that it could not be defended against. A 
minus change score indicated a change in the opposite direction. Thus, 
the theoretical range of change scores between time periods was from 
-8 to +8. 
The anxiety items were scored by assigning a score of one to a 
response which indicated that the S was anxious and a score of zero 
for items selected by the S which indicated that he was not anxious. 
Total scores were computed for each S for each of the two measures. The 
theoretical range of scores on the abbreviated Taylor Seale was 0 to 20; 
the obtained range was 0 to 18. The theoretical and obtained ranges on 




The mean before opinion scores indicate that there was an initial 
difference in mean opinion scores between the explicit and non-expli-
cit groups. The explicit group (•= 7.30) was more opposed to the 
position advocated by the communication than was the non-explicit 
group (m- 6.85) ( t= 1.80, p= .08, 2-tails). This difference in 
initial opinions between groups is modified by the opinion change 
scores employed in the following analyses. 
In the results which follow, the symbol "EC" is used to signify 
the group receiving an explicit communication from a credible commu-
nicator; "Ec" stands for the group receiving an explicit communication 
from a non-credible communicator; 11eC11 signifies that the particular 
group received a non-explicit communication from a credible communica-
tor; and "ec" refers to the group receiving a non-explicit communication 
froa a non-credible communicator. 
A plus sign (+) before a given mean change score indicates move-
ment away from the position advocated by the communication, in this 
case toward the position that biological warfare is a super weapon and 
cannot be defended against. A minus sign (-) indicates movement in the 
direction advocated by the communication, i.e. biological warfare is 
not a super weapon and can be defended against. 
The mean opinion change from before to immediate-after for the 
four experimental groups and the control group is shown in Table 1. 
Table l 


















The experimental groups all showed a significantly greater amount 
of opinion change than did the control group ( p < .01, 2-tails for 
the difference between the mean of each experimental group and the 
* control group ). The experimental groups were not different from the 
control groups initially. 
Insofar as explicitness is concerned, the over-all explicit group 
(m=-2.13) showdd greater opinion change than the over-all non-explicit 
group (m--1.71). However, this difference yielded a p value of only 
.10, 2-tails. There was no significant difference between the credible 
and non-credible conditions. 
Within the credible condition, the explicit treatment was more 
effective than the non-explicit in ch anging opinions (p= .06, 1-tail). 
Within the non-credible condition, there was no significant difference 
between the explicit and non-explicit treatments. 
It might be expected that the explicit treatment with its clearly 
stated position would be likely to result in more Ss being aware of that 
position than would be the case with the non-explicit treatment where 
there was no clear statement of the position. To obtain information on 
* Unless otherwise specified, all p ~alues were obtained from t-tests. 
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this, an open-ended question was included which required the Ss to 
state the position of the communicator. This question was the first 
one responded to. About 62% of the Ss in the explicit condition re-
ported the communicator's position correctly whereas approximately 
40% of the Ss in the non-explicit condition so responded. The differ-
ence between the two groups, based on chi square yields a p value 
of < .001. 
In addition, the relationship between knowledge of the communica-
tor's position and opinion change was examined. The Ss were divided 
into two groups, a "plus" group which had indicated correct knowledge 
of the communicator's position and a "minus" group which had not. The 
opinion change scores for the eight sub-groups are given in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Mean Opinion Change Scores from Before to Immediate-After for 
Ss Know~·ng ( +) and Not Knowing (-) the Communicator 1 s Position 
EC Ec eC ec Total 
Means for -2.56 -1.82 -1.76 -2.00 -2.04 
( +) group (n=50) (n•56) (n=46) (n=22) (n=l74) 
Means for 
(-) group -1.82 -2.35 -1.59 -1.64 -1.80 
(n=34) (n•31) (na39) (n=61) (nal65) 
There is no significant difference in opinion change between the 
plus group as a whole and the minus group as a whole. Ss who apparently 
do not know the communicator's position or, at least, who do not 
express it in response to an open-ended question, are changed as much 
by the communication as are Ss who know the communicator's position. 
The difference in opinion change between the explicit and non-explicit 
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sub-groups within either the plus or the minus groups are not signifi-
cant but are in the same direction; the explicit show greater change 
than the non-explicit. No difference is found between the credible and 
non-credible conditions within either the plus or the minus groups. 
Within the explicit condition, an interaction is found between 
credibility and knowledge of the communicator's position. Among the 
Ss who knew the position, the credible group changed more than the 
non-credible. Among Ss who did not know the communicator's position, 
the non-credible group changed more than the credible (p < .10, 2-tails 
by analysis of variance). 
Initial position 
The Ss were divided into two groups on the basis of their before 
opinion scores. A median dichotomization was employed; the Ss with 
total scores below the median (m=5.03) were termed initially "favorable" 
to the communicator's position while the Ss whose total initial opinion 
scores fell above the median (m=8.91) were termed "unfavorable". The 
higher the initial scores, the more the S felt that biological war-
fare was a super weapon. Opinion change scores from before to immediate-
after for the favorable and unfavorable groups are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Mean Opinion Change Scores from Before to Immediate-After 
for Ss Initially Favorable and Unfavorable 
EC Ec eC ec Total 
Means for -.78 -.59 -.34 -.13 -.44 
favorables (n=32) (n-41) (n=47) (n-40) (n=l60) 
Means for -3.17 -3.28 -3.34 -3.23 -3.25 
favorables (n•52) (n-46) (n=38) (n-43) (n•l79) 
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All of the experimental groups were significantly different from 
the control group at the immediate-after time period (p at least < .10, 
2-tails for each comparison). In addition, the unfavorable group showed 
significantly greater opinion change than did the favorable group 
( p < .01, 2-tails). The smaller opinion change of the initially favor-
able group is obviously related to the limited extent of change possible 
for those closer to the communicator's position. 
Within the favorable group, the explicit treatment was more effective 
than the non-explicit in changing opinions (p=o .02, 1-tail}. Within the 
unfavorable group, there was no significant difference between the 
explicit and non-explicit treatments. Neither the favorable nor the 
unfavorable groups showed any differences between the credible and the 
non-credible conditions in amount of opinion change from before to 
immediate-after. 
Anxiety 
Taylor and others (16,17,18) using the Taylor Manifest Anxiety 
Scale have considered anxiety as a drive and have assumed that the 
higher the S's score on the Taylor Scale, the higher the underlying 
anxiety drive.If the conventional scoring system for the Taylor Scale 
is employed with the data of this study and high scorers are compared 
with low scorers, none of the predictions related to anxiety are sub-
stantiated. 
Eriksen (1,2) has raised the point that anxiety can be considered 
in its cue as well as its drive aapects. He sugge8ts that the Taylor 
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Scale is an indicator of the ways in which individuals handle their 
anxiety as well as of the amount of anxiety within the individual. His 
suggestion is based on his finding that the Taylor Scale shows a high 
positive correlation with the psychasthenia scale of the MMPI and a 
high negative correlation with the hysteria scale of the MMPI. On the 
assumption that the Ss scoring extremely high and extremely low on the 
Taylor Scale are more anxious than the Ss in the middle range* , the Ss 
in the upper and lower quartiles of the total distribution of anxiety 
scores were all consi dered to be "high" anxious Ss and those in the 
middle two quartiles to be "low" anxious Ss. 
The obtained range of scores on the Taylor Scale was from 0 to 18 
and the obtained mean was 6.04. While the distribution shows some 
skewness, this is not inconsistent with the distributions obtained by 
other experimenters using the Scale on college populations (13,24). The 
Taylor Scale bad an odd-even reliability coefficient of .78 using 
the Rulon formula (3). Opinion change scores for the lower quartile, 
middle two quartiles combined, and upper quartile are shown·in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Mean Opinion Change Scores from Before to Immediate-After 
for High and Low Anxiety Subjects 
High Anxiety Low Anxiety 
Upper Lower Combined Middle Quartiles Quartile Quartile 
Means -2.25 -2.04 -2.15 -1.73 
(n=83) (n=73) (n=l56) (n .. l83) 
* This assumption is based on the assumption of a high positive relation-
ship between anxiety and score on the psychasthenia and hysteria scales 
of the MMPI. 
25 
The mean opinion change scores of the upper quartile and the 
lower quartile groups are not significantly different from one another. 
The upper quartile group is significantly different from the middle 
group (pc .05, 1-tail). The lower quartile is not significantly 
different from the middle quartiles but the difference is in the direc-
tion of greater opinion change by the lower quartile group. The total 
high anxious group shows a higher mean opinion change than does the 
total low anxious group ( p= .05, 1-tail ). While the results are by 
no means clear-cut or conclusive, they appear to indicate that high 
anxious Ss are changed to a greater extent than are low anxious Ss 
when exposed to an anxiety-allaying communication. Table 5 gives the 
mean opinion change scores from before to immediate-after for high and 
low anxious Ss ( as categorized in Table 4 ) by experimental conditions. 
Table 5 
Mean Opinion Change Scores from Before to !.mediate-After 
for Ss Initially High or Low in Anxiety 
EC Ec eC ee 
Means- Low anxious Ss -2.36 -1.74 -1.40 -1.38 
(n=50) (n=38) (n=42) (n=53) 
Means- High anxious Ss -2.12 -2.22 -1.95 -2.37 
(nG34) (n=49) (n=43) (n=30) 
For low anxious Ss, the explicit treatment is more effective than 
the non-explicit treatment in changing opinions (p= .03, 1-tail). There 
is no difference in effectiveness between the explicit and non-explicit 
treatments for the high anxious Ss. 
A significant difference in opinion change was found between the 
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high and low anxious Ss who received the non-explicit communication. 
Here, high anxious Ss changed more than low anxious Ss (p= .04, 2-tails). 
There were no differences between the two groups ( high and low anxiety ) 
who received the explicit communication. 
Of interest also in Table 5 is the significantly greater opinion 
change of the high anxious Ss compared with the low anxious Ss within 
the non-credible condition (pE .04, 2-tails). With a credible communi-
cator, no difference is found between the high anxious and lows anxious 
Ss. There was no difference in opinion change between the credible and 
non-credible conditions within either the low anxious or the high 
anxious groups. 
Acquisition of content 
In order to determine whether or not the obtained effectiveness of 
the explicit condition over the non-explicit in changing opinions was 
possibly due to a difference in acquisition of content of the communica-
tion between the explicit and non-explicit groups, the fact-quiz scores 
for the experimental groups were compared. The fact-quiz consisted of 
six multiple-choice items pertaining to informational material appearing 
within the body of the communication. The theoretical and obtained 
range of scores is from 0 to 6. The grand mean for all Ss was 5.09. 
Table 6 presents the relevant means for the groups. 
Means 
Table 6 













The Ss reading the explicit communication show a significantly 
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h"gher mean fact-quiz score than the Ss reading the non-explicit commu-
nication (p= .06, 2-tails). There were no differences between the credible 
and non-credible groups. 
In view of the greater effectiveness of the explicit treatment in 
changing opinions, this finding of a higher fact-quiz score in the 
explicit group raises the possibility that there may be a relationship, 
in this study, between acquisition of content and opinion change; that 
is, the Ss who received the explicit treatment may have shown greater 
opinion change because they acquired more of the content of the communi-
cation than did the Ss in the non-explicit treatment. In order to examine 
this possible relationship more closely, the Ss were divided into two 
groups, those who had obtained the maximum score of 6 on the fact-quiz 
and those who had not. ( The latter group had an over-all mean of 4.50.) 
While this was not deemed a most desireable "breaking" place, it repre-
sented a median break and was necessitated by the high over-all fact-
quiz scores. ( It will be recalled that the mean over-all fact-quiz 
score was 5.09.) Table 7 shows the opinion change for the four experi-
mental groups with acquisition of content held constant. 
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Table 7 
Mean Opinion Change Scores from Before to Immediate-After 
With Fact-Quiz Held Constant 
EC Ec eC ec Total 
Fact-quiz 6 -2.21 -2.21 -1.97 -1.96 -2.10 
group (n=34) (n=38) (n=33) (n=26) (n=l31) 
Fact-quiz 0-5 -2.30 -1.86 -1.50 -1.63 -1.81 
group (na50) (n:a49) (n=52) (n=57) (n=208) 
Table 7 shows no over-all relationship between acquisition of 
content and opinion change. Furthermore, with acquisition held con-
stant, there were no significant differences between the explicit and 
non-explicit or the credible and non-credible sub-groups within either 
the fact-quiz 6 or the fact-quiz 0-5 groups. 
Judgmental items 
An analysis of the question of fairness of presentation ("Do you 
think the author of the article was fair in his presentation of the 
facts, or did he write a one-sided report ?") reveals no significant 
differences between the credible and non-credible or the explicit and 
non-explicit groups in the proportion of Ss saying that the article 
was fair. An analysis of the question directed at the Ss' perception 
of the propagandistic intent of the communicator ( "Do you think the 
article should be considered as a piece of "propaganda"?") reveals 
no significant differences between the credible and non-credible or 
the explicit and non-explicit groups in the proportion of Ss saying 
that the article should be considered a piece of propaganda. Responses 
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to both of the questions indicate that approximately 70% of all the 
Ss felt that the article presented a fair treatment of the topic and 
was not propagandistic in intent. 
Recall of source 
Despite the 'fact that the name of the source appeared at the 
beginning and at the end of each article, an open-ended question asking 
the S to write the name of the source was included in the after question-
naire. Table 8 shows the percent of Ss in each experimental group 
recalling the source correctly. 
Table 8 
Recall of Source 
EC 












The Ss in the credible condition were more likely to recall the 
source correctly than were the Ss in the non-credible condition 
(p < .02 by chi square). There was no significant difference between 
the explicit and non-explicit groups in the proportion of Ss recalling 
the source correctly. 
Since there were no obtained differences in opinion change between 
the credible and non-credible groups, the finding that there is a 
differential recall of source between these two groups raises the 
question that perhaps the lack of a difference in opinion change was 
related to this difference in recall. To check this possibility, opinion 
30 
change was calculated holding recall of source constant. When the Ss 
recalling the source correctly in the credible and non-credible condi-
tions are compared, there is still no difference in mean opinion change 
from before to immediate-after. 
Concern about biological warfare 
After reading the communication, the Ss were asked two questions 
regarding their concern about biological warfare and the importance of 
the topic to them. Because the responses to the two questions were very 
highly correlated (p < .001 by chi square), the Ss were divided into 
two groups. Those that had responded that they were "extremely" or 
"very" concerned about biological warfare and who also felt that the 
topic was "extremely" or "very" important to them were included in one 
group and all other Ss were included in the ·second group. Opinion 
changes between and within these two groups are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 
Mean Opinion Change Scores from Before to Immediate-After 
for Ss Relatively High and Low in Concern About 
Biological Warfare 
EC Ec eC ec Total 
Highly concerned -.64 -1.46 -.82 -1.67 -1.20 
(n=ll) (n=l3) (n .. 22) (n=24) (n=70) 
Not Highly 
-2.51 -2.11 -1.98 -1.76 -2.11 Concerned (n=73) (n=74) (n-63) (n=59) (n=269) 
The Ss who in the after questionnaire indicated that they were 
not highly concerned about biological warfare showed greater mean 
change scores than did the Ss who indicated great concern (p < .01, 
2-tails). The two groups did not differ significantly in initial 
opinions. 
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Further analysis indicates that with a credible communicator the 
Ss who were not highly concerned show greater opinion change than do 
those that are highly concerned (p < .01, 2-tails), but that with a 
non-credible communicator there is no difference in opinion change 
between the two "concern" groups. Similarly, in the explicit treatment 
the Ss who are not highly concerned change more in opinion than do the 
Ss who are highly concerned {p• .02, 2-tails) whereas in the non-
explicit treatment there is no difference. A tendency was also noted 
for the Ss who were highly concerned to show greater change with a 
non-credible source than with a credible one and for the Ss who were 
not highly concerned to show a greater change with a credible source 
than with a non-credible one ( interaction is significant at < .10 
by analysis of variance). 
Finally, the responses to the combined questions indicated that the 
Ss who were exposed to the non-explicit treatment were more likely than 
the Ss exposed to the explicit treatment to say that biological warfare 
was of concern and importance to them (p < .01 by chi square). 
Delayed-After Results 
After a six week period, the mean opinion scores of the experi-
mental groups were still significantly different from the mean of the 
control group, as shown in Table 10. The difference between any experi-
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mental group and the control group yields a p value of < .001, 2-tails. 
Mean 
Table 10 
Mean Delayed-After Opinion Scores for Experimental 
















Table 10 also indicates that at this time period, there were no 
significant differences between experimental groups. Also, as shown in 
Table 11, there were no differences between experimental groups with 
regard to the amount of opinion change from the immediate-after to the 
delayed-after periods. 
Table 11 















An analysis of the before---delayed-after opinion change scores 
(Table 12) indicates that there is still a tendency for the explicit 
condition to change more than the non-explicit after the six week inter-
val. The difference is not significant, however. 
Table 12 















There were no opinion change differences between the credible and 
non-credible groups. Similarly, there were no significant differences 
between the explicit and non-explicit treatments within either the 
credible or non-credible conditions although in both conditions the 
explicit group had a higher mean change score than the non-explicit 
group. 
Insofar as retention of knowledge of the communicator's position 
is concerned, there were no differences between the explicit and non-
explicit groups in the proportion of Ss knowing the communicator's 
position at the delayed-after time period. No differences in opinion; 
change from before to delayed-after (Table 13) were found between those 
who had and had not indicated knowledge of the communicator's position 
at the delayed-after time period. 
Table 13 
Mean Opinion Change Scores from Before to Delayed-After for 
Ss Knowing (+) and Not Knowing (-) the Communicator's Position 
EC Ec eC ec Total 
Means for -1.88 -1.69 -1.69 -1.74 -1.75 
( +) group (n=26) (n=32) (n=26) (n=l9) (n•l03) 
Means for -1.79 -1.91 -1.27 -1.24 -1.54 
(-) group (n=47) (n=44) (n=48) (n=-50) (n=l89) 
Initial position 
An analysis of the data in terms of initial position of the Ss 
reveals that both the faYOrable and unfavorable groups were still 
significantly different from their control groups six weeks after 
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having been exposed to the communication. ( P value for the comparison 
of any experimental group with its control group is < .01, 2-tails.) 
The opinion change for the experimental groups with initial position 
held constant is shown in Table 14. 
Table 14 
Mean Opinion Change Scores from Before to Delayed-After 
for Ss Initially Favorable and Unfavorable 
EC Ec eC ec 
Favorable -.46 +.08 -.05 -.09 
(n=28) (nm36) (n-41) (n=32} 
Unfavorable -2.64 -3.53 -3.06 -2.49 
(n-45) (n=40) (n•33) (n=37) 
Within the favorable or unfavorable groups, there are no signifi-
cant differences in opinion change between the explicit and non-explicit 
or the credible and non-credible sub-groups. However, there is a signi-
ficant interaction between explicitness and credibility within the 
unfavorable group (p < .05, 2-tails, based on analysis of variance}. 
It would seem that for Ss whose initial position is discrepant from 
that of the communicator, if the communicator is a credible one, the 
non-explicit form of communication is more effective than the explicit; 
non-if the communicator is a credible one, the explicit form of communica-
tion is more effective than the non-explicit. 
Anxiety 
Six weeks after exposure to the communication, both the low and the 
high anxiety groups still differed significantly from the control group 
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in opinion (p < .01, 2-tails). The opinion change scores from before 
to delayed-after for the experimental groups are shown in Table 15. 
Table 15 
Mean Opinion Change Scores from Before to Delayed-After 
for Ss Initially High or Low in Anxiety 
EC Ec eC ec 
Low anxious -1.83 -1.63 -1.00 -1.35 
Ss (n=42) (n=32) (n=37) (n-43) 
High anxious -1.77 -1.95 -1.84 -1.42 
Ss (n=31) (n=44) (n=37) (n=26) 
Over-all, there is no significant difference in retained opinion 
change between the low anxious and high anxious groups. Furthermore, 
there are no significant differences between any of the experimental 
conditions within either the low anxious or high anxious groups. 
Retention of content 
Table 16 gives the mean fact-quiz scores for each experimental 
group at the delayed-after time period. 
Table 16 














There are no significant differences between any of the groups. No 
relationship was found between retention of content and opinion change 
from before to delayed-after. Furthermore, when retention is held con-
stant there are no differences between the explicit and non-explicit 
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or the credible and non-credible conditions within either the fact-
quiz 6 or the fact-quiz 0-5 groups. 
Judgmental items 
An analysis of the question of fairness of presentation reveals 
a greater tendency for the Ss in the credible condition to say that the 
author gave a fair presentation {p < .05 by chi square). Also, there 
is a gre~ter tendency for the Ss who read the non-explicit form of the 
communication than for those who read the explicit to say that the 
author's treatment of the topic was fair {p < .10 by chi square). 
Responses to the question pertaining to the Ss' perception of the 
propagandistic intent of the author reveal no differences between the 
credible and non-credible or the explicit and non-explicit condition 
in the proportion of Ss saying "propaganda" or ''not propaganda". 
Recall of source 
As was the case at the immediate-after time period, the Ss in the 
credible condition show, at the delayed-after time period, a greater 
tendency to recall the source of the communication than do the Ss in 


















The difference in recall of source between the credible and the 
non-credible conditions has a p value of < .10 based on chi square. 
No differences in opinion change were found between the credible 
and non-credible groups when recall of source was held constant. 
Concern about biological warfare 
An analysis of the combined questions on the Ss' concern about 
biological warfare indicated that the difference observed at the 
immediate-after period between the explicit and non-explicit treatments 
in the proportion of Ss saying that they were concerned about the topic 
is not present at the delayed-after period. Opinion change scores for 
the experimental groups separated according to concern are shown in 
Table 18. 
Table 18 
Mean Opinion Change Scores from Before to Delayed-After 
for Ss Relatively High and Low in Concern 
About Biological Warfare 
EC Ec eC ec Total 
Highly concerned -.83 -1.00 -1.23 -1.14 -1.06 
(n=l2) (n=l3) (n=l3) (n=l4) (n=52) 
Not highly -2.00 -2.05 -1.45 -1.41 -1.73 
concerned (n=6l) (n=-63) (n=60) (n=56) (n=240) 
The Ss who indicated that they were not concerned about the topic 
again show a tendency to greater opinion change than do the Ss who 
indicated that they were concerned about the topic (p= .11, 2-tails). 
A closer examination of the data indicates that within the explicit 
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condition, the Ss who are not highly concerned show significantly 
greater opinion change than do the Ss who are concerned (p= .05,2-tails). 
Within the non-explicit condition, the differences between the two con-
cern groups are not significant. Holding concern constant, there are 
no differences between the explicit and non-explicit or the credible 
and non-credible groups within either the highly concerned group or the 




The indication that the explicit treatment is somewhat more 
effective than the non-explicit tends to support the findings of 
Hovland and Mandell (6). However, the basis for the greater effective-
ness is not certain. Knowledge of the communicator's position may be 
an important factor, as Thistlethwaite, de Haan and Kamenetzky (19) 
have noted. The present study finds, as they did, that there was more 
comprehension of the communicator's position in the explicit treatment. 
However, no relationship was found between comprehension and opinion 
change. It seems, therefore, at least as pertains to this study, that 
knowledge of the communicator's position is not, in and of itself, a 
critical factor for opinion change. This finding is consistent with 
those of Thistlethwaite, de Haan and Kamenetzky vho, in addition to 
finding no difference in opinion change between the explicit and non-
explicit groups despite differences in comprehension, found that 
although programs with well-defined organization produced greater 
comprehension than programs with poorly-defined organization, the two 
types of programs did not differ in mean amount of opinion change. This, 
together with the finding that there was no relationship between 
fact-quiz score and opinion change in this study, suggests that the 
opinion change process is, perhaps, more complex than is generally 
assumed. The assumption that the S must first know what the communica-
tor's position is, then rehearse the message of the communication to 
himself and, finally, decide to change his opinion after due considera-
tion of its merits, does not seem tenable in terms of the present results. 
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Consistent with the obtained results is a conception of opinion 
change as an on-going process in which, from the time the S starts 
reading the communication he is being affected by the many cues to 
which he is being exposed, cues as to the intent of the communication's 
source and the direction of the communication, among others. While a 
given S may not be able to put everything he has read in a communica-
tion together in organized and meaningful form or to state what the 
communicator's position was, he apparently is able to get enough of 
the ttdrifttt of the communication to be as influenced by it as were 
others who were better able to verbalize the communicator's position 
and other relevant informational data. This over-all ttsensing 11 or 
"feeling tone" regarding the gist of the communication appears to 
be of much importance and is consistent with the results obtained in 
several concept formation studies as reported by Vinacke (20) where 
it was found that an individaal may be able to act in a manner showing 
that he can act in terms of the concept without knowing what it is; 
that is, he can successfully identify specimens of the class without 
being able to verbalize the concept. 
While this explanation accounts for the .lack of a difference in 
opinion change between the Ss who knew the communicator's position 
and those who did not, it does not account for the superiority of the 
explicit condition over the non-explicit in changing opinions. 
It is possible that in addition to making the communicator's 
position clearer, the explicit treatment serves another purpose, that 
of tying together the content of the communication into a more meaningful 
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whole. Given a fairly complex communication, it is quite likely that 
the S while reading it is often not able to piece together all of the 
information and arguments to which he is being exposed into a meaning-
ful whole, although, as we have seen, he may be getting a general 
idea of the direction of the communication. The more complex the 
communication, the more likely he will have difficulty in getting this 
over-all picture. In the explicit condition, upon reaching the con-
clusion and actually seeing it before him, he is now able, upon re-
reading the communication or reflecting upon it, to see how the pre-
ceding material is related to the basic message. Thus, the explicit 
presentation of the conclusion serves to "package" or tie together 
the body of the communication so that it becomes more clearly related 
to the conclusion. The impact of this "unified", better understood 
communication is thus greater than in the non-explicit condition where 
the S is likely, if he has reached a conclusion, to be less certain that 
it is the appropriate one since he has no referent against which to 
check the appropriateness. While it is probable that there is some-
what of a 11tie-in 11 effect if the S arrives at the appropriate- con-
clusion on his own, the attendant uncertainty should serve to reduce 
the over-all impact of the communication. Unfortunately, no measure 
of certainty was included in this study so that it is not possible to 
check the above hypothesis. 
However, with uncertainty and a communication that deals with a 
potentially anxiety-arousing topic, somewhat greater residual concern 
would be expected than where certainty prevailed. A person who is 
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uncertain of the anxiety-allaying conclusion and cannot gain full 
reassurance from it is likely to evidence concern. The results indi-
cated that the Ss in the non-explicit condition showed more concern 
than the Ss in the explicit condition. Furthermore, the aroused con-
cern which it is hypothesized, arose from the inability to be certain 
of the "correct" answer with its potential influence on acceptance, 
evidences itself in less opinion change than is the case where concern 
is not manifested. The data with respect to residual concern appear 
to confirm the results obtained by Janis and Feshback (10). Since there 
were no before measures of concern comparable to the after measures 
of concern, it is not known whether concern increased or decreased from 
before reading the communication to after reading it. The indications 
are that the before measures of anxiety on the Taylor Scale, the before 
measures on the concern-about-war inventory and the measures of initial 
opinion were not related to the post-communication concern. Thus, we 
can only speak of residual concern rather then in terms of anxiety 
arousal or anxiety reduction. 
The differential effects of the two conditions, explicit and non-
explicit, on opinion change are not too strong in the present experi-
ment. Possibly, a greater discrepancy between the two conditions might 
be obtained with more abstract and less logically organized communica-
tions in view of the greater need in such cases for the content to be 
tied together in order for sense to be made of it. 
Both the Hovland and Mandell (6) and the Thistlethwaite, de Haan 
and Kamenetzky (19) studies have mentioned Rogers (15) and the so-called 
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"non-directive" approach to psychotherapy in connection with the 
variables of explicitness and non-explicitness. While there may be 
some similarities between "explicitness" and "directiveness" or between 
"non-explicitness" and "non-directiveness", the findings of the present 
study are in no way interpreted as testing the effectiveness of the 
non-directive approach to psychtherapy. 
Before discussing the specific predictions concerning explicitness 
and credibility , a word about the latter variable is in order. We 
hesitate to attribute the lack of opinion change differences between 
the credible and non-credible conditions to a weakness in the induction 
of the variable. Extreme care was taken to select sources which were 
as widely divergent as possible. While no measure of the attributed 
credibility of the two sources by the Ss was obtained, Weiss bas 
* . stated 1n reference to recent measures he has taken, that the New 
York Times and the Daily Worker are perceived by the Ss as differing 
greatly in credibility. Furthermore, not only were the names of the 
sources used in the communication, but qualifying phrases amplifying 
the credibility or lack of credibility were included along with the 
name of the source; thus, the additional stigma of communism was 
attached to the Daily Worker whereas the general acceptability of the 
New York Times as the most widely read newspaper in the country was 
emphasized. 
While the credibility of a source may be considered apart from 
* personal communication 
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what he communicates, given a communication situation an investigation 
of the effects of credibility on opinion change must also consider the 
relationship between the communicator and the subject matter being 
communicated. We might expect that given a communication which is on 
a non-controversial topic, about which the communicatees know little 
and with which the communicator is perceived to be not closely rela-
ted in terms of having an "axe" to grind, there would be less difference 
in acceptance between credible and non-credible conditions than would 
be the case for a controversial topic about which the Ss were well 
informed and with which the communicator is perceived as having an 
"axe" to grind. Thus, given a topic such as " The Communist Party 
Should Not Be Outlawed in· .. the United States", the Daily Worker would 
be perceived of as more non-credible by comparison with the New York 
Times than would be the case for a topic such as biological warfare 
and attendant opinion changes would be thus affected. It is presumed 
that the lack of a difference in opinion change between the credible 
and non-credible conditions in the present experiment is due, at least 
in part, to the relationship between the particular sources used and 
the various characteristics of the communication mentioned above. 
Although credibility does not appear to be a strong factor per se 
in this experiment, it does apparently, have a modifying influence in 
certain conditions, e.g. in the explicit condition for the Ss who in-
dicate knowledge of the communicator's position, within the non-credible 
condition for low and high anxious Ss, and within the high and the 
low residual concern groups. 
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Given a non-credible source, we would expect on the basis of our 
initial assumption, that the non-explicit treatment would be more 
effective than the explicit since it served to minimize the S's 
perception of the source as attempting to manipulate ••• as being non-
credible. On the other hand, we have seen that there is a tendency for 
the explicit condition to be more effective than the non-explicit, at 
least under the conditions of this experiment. This conflict between 
the hypothesi zed tttying-togethern effect of the explicit condition 
and the hypothesi zed minimizing effect of the non-explicit condition 
in terms of the communicator's manipulative intent could be responsible 
for the finding of no difference between the two treatments in the 
non-credible condition; the two opposing "forces" counter-act each 
other. In the credible condition, the "negative" effect of explicitness 
as a heightener of perceived manipulative intent is not so operative; 
here, explicitness serves to heighten the S's perception of the source 
as credible. This, coupled with the so-called "packaging" effect,dis-
cussed above, makes for the greater effectiveness of the explicit 
treatment over the non-explicit with a credible source. 
The results for initial position were possibly complicated by the 
generally favorable initial opinions of all Ss; the so-called 11 unfa-
vorables" were initially towards the center of the theoretical distri-
bution of favorability. In addition, when an S's opinion is greatly 
discrepant from that of the communicator, the S should have a good 
idea of the "sense" of the communication. Thus, with a cogent communi-
cation, it might be expected that explicitness would not be differen-
tially effective among those initially unfavorable; here, even in 
the non-explicit condition the Ss are able to sense the main tenor 
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of the communication because its message is so strongly opposed to their 
own position. But when the S is not very discrepant from the communica-
tor, he is less likely to sense the precise position suggested by the 
general tenor of the communication; he must make a finer discrimination, 
in effect. Thus, it might be expected that an explicit statement of the 
appropriate conclusion would result in greater opinion change for the 
initially favorable Ss than would no explicit statement. 
The prediction that Ss high in anxiety would show greater opinion 
change than Ss low in anxiety is verified. It should be noted that 
the prediction was not substantiated when the Taylor system of scoring 
the anxiety scale was used; only with the Eriksen-implied method waa 
it substantiated. Further inquiry into the two conceptualizations of 
anxiety seems warranted. 
The anxiety results are interpreted as supporting the congruency 
conceptualization (22,23) which deals with anxiety as a response pre-
disposition and considers the viewpoint of the communication in rela-
tion to that predisposition. 
The prediction that for low anxious Ss the explicit condition would 
be more effective than the non-explicit holds; that for the high anxious 
Ss does not. This may mean that the strong motive to accept in the 
high anxious Ss overcomes the factor of lessened certainty in the non-
explicit condition. 
Over-all the results are interpreted as supporting the initial 
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contention regarding the complexity of the communication process. M1en 
attention is given to the communicator, the communication and the commu-
nicatee, complex inter-relationships are discernible. The present find-
ings need further verification and amplification. The findings on 
knowledge of the communicator's position suggest further inquiry into 
the actual process of opinion formation. When an S is reading a commu-
nication does the contention that the opinion change process commences 
with the first sentence or paragraph and continues throughout the 
reading hold up ? Or does it vary according to the complexity of the 
communication as is also suggested ? Do Ss who cannot verbalize the 
communicator's position or who do not acquire the content of the commu-
nication nevertheless have an over-all "feeling tone" concerning the 
general direction in which the communication is intending to influence 
them ? 
Inquiry into the "packaging" effect of explicitness is also suggested. 
Does the explicit statement of the conclusion serve to tie in previously 
unrelated communication material ? 
Regarding credibility, the effect of various types of sources paired 
with various types of communications mi ght be examined. Similarly, 
attributed credibility by the Ss might be examined to determine what 
kind of an anchoring effect one kind of source has on another. Structural 
aspects of the communication can be explored further. What happens when 
the explicit conclusion i~ stated before the end of the communication ? 
Are there certain cues that can be systematically "built in" to the 
communication to make for the S getting a subtle perception of the point 
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of view of the communication without giving the effect that the commu-
nicator is attempting to manipulate or persuade ? 
Finally, using Eriksen's conceptualization of anxiety, the effects 
of various types of anxiety-reducing and anxiety-arousing communica-
tions upon hysterics and psychasthenics as well as "normals" might He 
explored. Further consideration might also be given to the relation-






National Council for Social Research 
New York, N.Y. 
OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE 
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The National Council for Social Research, a non-profit organi-
zation which conducts research in the social sciences, is taking a survey 
of the opinions of college students throughout the country as part of a 
sociological study of what people in different regions of the country think 
about certain topics. We are asking your cooperation in helping us to 
obtain your opinions on these topics. 
The attached questionnaire is made up of three parts. The first part 
is multiple-choice in form and asks for your opinions on various topics. 
Th,e second part is true -false and asks for information regarding yourself, 
your beliefs, habits and feelings. The third part asks for pertinent informa-
tion about your background such as your age, sex, place of birth and other 
information which might prove useful to us for comparing you and your fellow 
students with students at other colleges and universities. 
Please note that these questionnaires are completely anonymous. 
Nowhere do we ask for your name since we are not interested in you as 
an individual but, rather; as a representative of a particular college. 
The worth of our study depends upon your giving sincere, honest 
answers to all questions. If you are in doubt about a particular question, 
select the answer that comes closest to expressing your true opinion, 
Make sure that you answer every question and that you do not skip 
any pages. You have approximately one-half hour in which to complete the 
questionnaire. 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
National Council for Social Research 
New York, N.Y. 
I. OPINION QUESTIONNAffiE 
The questions below pertain to your opinions on certain topics. 
Ple'ase answer them as frankly and honestly as possible. There are no 
right or wrong answers. As you can see, we are not asking for your 
name: your identity is completely safeguarded • 
. 1. To what extent would you favor lowering the voting age limit so 
that persons eighteen, nineteen, and twenty years old could vote 
in elections ? (circle one) 
a. strongly favor 
b. moderately favor 
c. uncertain 
d. moderately oppose 
e. strongly oppose 
2. Do you think religion is gaining or losing influence in the life of 
the nation ? (circle one) 
a. definitely gaining influence 
b. probably gaining influence 
c. uncertain 
d. probably losing influence 
e. definitely losing influence 
3. In your opinion, what ~re the chances of a person surviving a 
biological attack on the United States ? (circle one) 
a. very good 
b. good 
c. fairly good 
d. 50-50 
e. fairly poor 
f. poor 
g. very poor 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
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4. Would you favor a national sales tax as a means of balancing the 
national budget ? (circle one) 
a. definitely yes 
b. probably yes 
c. uncertain 
d. probably not 
e. definitely not 
5. In your opinion, is biological warfare a 11 super" weapon as far as 
the United States is concerned ? (circle one) 
a. definitely yes 
b. probably yes 
c. uncertain 
d. probably not 
e. definitely not 
6. In Australia people are made to pay a fine if they do not vote on 
election day. Do you think the American government should make 
· people pay a fine if they don't vote on election day ? (circle one) 
a. definitely yes 
b. probably yes 
c. uncertain 
d. probably not 
e. definitely not 
7. On the whole, which sex do you think is more even-tempered, men 
or women ? (circle one) 
a. men, definitely 
b. men, probably 
c. uncertain 
d. women, probably 
e. women, definitely 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
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8. How much protection can an individual have from germs and other 
products of biological warfare ? (circle one) 
a. 100% protection 
b. about 80% 
c. about 60% 
d. about 50% 
e. about 40% 
f. about 20% 
g. no protection at all 
9. Would you favor a national lottery as a means of balancing the 
national budget ? (circle one) 
a. definitely yes 
b. probably yes 
c. uncertain 
d. probably not 
e, definitely not 
10. On the average, how do you think that religious people compare 
with non-religious people insofar as being moral is concerned ? 
(circle one) 
a. religious definitely more moral 
b. religious probably more moral 
c. uncertain 
d. non-religious probably more moral . 
e. non-religious definitely more moral 
11. On the whole, which sex do you think has more ability to create 
or invent new things, men or women ? (circle one) 
a. men, definitely 
b. men, probably 
c. uncertain 
d. women, probably 
e. women, definitely 
PLEASE GO ON TO NE.XT PAGE 
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12. In your optnton, to what extent can biological warfare be defended 
against by the United States ? (circle one) 
a. completely 
b. to a very great extent 
c. to a great extent 
d. to a medium extent 
e. to a small extent 
f. to a very small extent 
g. not at all 
13. How does your attitude toward religion compare with that of your 
parents ? (circle one) 
a. parents are more religious 
b. parents and I are about equally religious 
c. I am more religious 
d. uncertain 
14. On the whole, which sex do you think is more willing to accept 
new ideas, · men or women ? (circle one) 
a. men, definitely 
b. men, probably 
c. uncertain 
d. women, probably 
e. women, definitely 




The following items pertain to your personal feelings about a number 
of topics. Again, we ask you to answer them frankly with the assurance 
that your answers are completely anonymous. 
Circle the response which most nearly describes your answer to each 



















































I am usually calm and not easily upset. 
I cannot keep my mind on one thing. 
I become emotionally upset when I think of people fighting 
with one another. 
I am a high strung person. 
I frequently find myself worrying about something. 
The thought of another war makes me sick to my stomach. 
I do not tire quickly. 
I worry quite a bit over possible misfortune. 
I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces. 
I am inclined to take things hard. 
The mere thought of large scale germ warfare makes me uneasy. 
I am easily embarrassed. 
I am more sensitive than most other people. 
The tremendous race to build bigger and better hydrogen 
bombs scares me. 
I worry over money and business. 
I have sometimes felt that difficulties were piling up so 
high that I could not overcome them. 
I worry quite a bit over the possibility of another war. 
At times I think I am no good at all. 
I become anxious whenever I hear of the discovery of a new 
lethal weapon. 
I wish I could be as happy as others. 
I shrink from facing a crisis or difficulty. 
It's hard to ·plan one's future activities with a constant 
threat of war hanging over one's head. 
I am certainly lacking in self-confidence. 
I feel anxiety about something or someone almost all of 
the time. 
People who say that there will always be wars make me uneasy. 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
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26. T F Sometimes I become so excited that I find it hard to get 
to sleep. 
27. T F The outlawing of atomic and biological warfare would make 
me feel a lot more secure. 
28. T F I must admit that I have at times been worried beyond 
reason over something that really did not matter. 
29. T F I certainly feel quite useless at times. 
30. T F Any kind of violence makes me anxious. 
III. BACKGROUND DATA 
The following information is needed for statistical purposes. 
Please answer all of the questions. 
1. Date of birth 
----~--~------~~--------~------Month Day Year 
2. Sex: male 
female 
3. Place of birth 
---------C~t~.t-y--------------~S~t-a_t_e ____ ___ 
4. Class: 






5. Father's oc.cupation 
----------------------------------
6. Own intended occupation 
------------------------------
7. College major or intended major 
--------------------
B. College residence: 
(check one) 












(credible communicator) 60 
We are interested in obtaining your opinions concerning the 
following article which appeared in a recent edition of the New York 
Times, one of the most widely read newspapers in the United States. 
Read the article carefully. You will be asked questions about it when 
you have finished. 
Is Biological Warfare A Super Weapon ? 
}ulitary authorities, politicians, educators, the clergy and 
the population in general are currently devoting much time to discussing 
the horrors of atomic warfare and the necessity of preventing its use 
lest "all humanity perish from the ,face of the earth". This great con-
cern with atomic weapons is due to the fact that these weapons cannot 
be defended against. They are truly "super11 weapons, and according to 
most authorities their use would result in the destruction of our 
civilization. 
Neglected in all this discussion has been a consideration of 
other weapons of war which might possibly be used in the event of another 
conflict, and which, like atomic warfare, have also been referred to as 
"super" weapons. It is my purpose here to discuss one such weapon ••• 
biological warfare ••• and to try to determine ~mether or not we in the 
United States should regard biological warfare as a 11 super11 weapon. 
Remember, a 11 super11 weapoh is one which cannot be defended against. If 
strong, sound defenses can be prepared to drastically reduce the destruc-
tive potential of a weapon, then that weapon is not a "super11 weapon. 
If adequate protection is not possible, then the weapon must be classed 
as 11 super". 
Let us first familiarize ourselves with biological warfare. 
(non-credible communicator) 
We are interested in obtaining your op1n1ons concerning the 
following article which appeared in a recent edition of the Dai1y 
Worker, official newspaper of the Connnunist Party in the United States. 
Read the article careful~y. You will be asked questions about it when 
you have finished. 
Is Biological Warfare A Super Weapon ? 
Military authorities; politicians, educators, the clergy and 
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the population in general are currently devoting much time to discussing 
the horrors of atomic warfare and the necessity of preventing its use 
lest 11 all humanity perish from the face of the earth." .This great con-
cern with atomic weapons is due to the fact that these weapons cannot 
be defended against. They are truly 11 super11 weapons, and according .to 
most authorities their use would result in the destruction of our 
civilization. 
Neglected in all this discussion has been a consideration of 
other weapons of war which might possibly be used in the event of another 
conflict, and which, like atomic warfare, have also been referred to as 
11 super11 weapons. It is my purpose here to discuss one such weapon ••• 
biological warfare •.• and to try to determine whether or not we in the 
United States should regard biological warfare as a"super" weapon. 
Remember, a "super" weapon is one which cannot be defended against. If 
strong, sound defenses can be prepared to drastically reduce the destruc-
tive potential of a weapon, then that weapon is not a 11 super 11 weapon. 
If adequate protection is not possible, then the weapon must be classed 
as 11 super11 • 
Let us first familiarize ourselves with biological warfare~ 
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Scientists tell us that ther~ are tvm main kinds. 
First, there are attacks with "living" agents. These are dif-
ferent kinds of small living things which sometimes cause sickness or 
death in people, animals or plants. You no doubt have seen plant-
killing insects at work and you no doubt. have heard of bacteria, viruses 
and other disease-causing things. 
The second kind of biological vtarfare is that vthich deals 1tiith 
special kinds of poisons called 11 toxins 11 • Toxins are poisons produced 
by some living things. .The kinds of toxins most likely to be used in 
biological vtarfare come from plant germs called bacteria. 
We will only consider the fir s t type of biological vtarfare in 
this article since scientific experts generally acknowledge that the 
second type (toxins) has been proven to be generally impractical. It 
must be remembered that a toxin is a poison and that it cannot spread 
itself but must be administered directly in food or drink or by in-
jection. This is in and of itself a defense against widespread effec-
tiveness of the toxin as a weapon, for although we might romantically 
picture sinister-looking enemy agents sneaking around putting poison 
in people's food, this method of biological attack would be impractical 
since it would affect only very limited numbers of people. 
Our main concern is with the spreading of diseases, viruses 
and bacteria either against man or against the resources of man such as 
his food supplies. 
Since no one has ever carried out a biological attack against 
any country, much of what we say here will be in the form of specula-
tion. However, we are in a good position to speculate because in actu-
ality there is little difference between having a disease "planted" in 
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a country by an enemy or having the same disease 11 naturally11 arise 
without having been 11 planted11 • The disease is the same disease no 
matter how it started and the same methods must be used to combat it. 
It can be seen, then, that if we can get a good picture of how a coun-
try ordinarily handles diseases, we will have an accurate indication 
of how well that countr;>r could resist a biological attack. 
In order to show which defenses are most effective against 
biological attacks, let us take two countries which, by stra11ge coinci-
dence, have a history of having had the same diseases occurring at about 
the same time. From the past experiences of these countries, Mexico 
and Australia, in handling the same diseases, viruses, etc., we should 
be able to infer just how well t hese countries would be able to defend 
themselves against biological attacks. By keeping in mind existing 
conditions in the United Sta.tes, we should then be able to determine 
how well this country can defend against biological attacks. 
One has only to look at the recent (1947) epidemic of the 
dread hoof-and-mouth disease in Hexico to see what a disease can do to 
a country's food supply. This fearful disease resulted in over 350,000 
head of cattle lost either directly by death due to the disease or by 
destruction by authorities in an effort to control the spread of the 
disease. The terrible loss in potential meat and meat products made it 
necessary for Mexico to increase its beef imports to the tune of 
$2 ,345, 000 a year for the four years that it took to raise new cattle, 
placing a very severe strain on the economy of that country and adver-
sely affecting the morale of its people. 
There is no evidence that these epidemics were the work of 
11 enemy11 agents. But these could have been enemy attacks i.f Mexico had 
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been at war, and they would have been very successful attacks because 
the Mexicans were virtually unable to defend against the ravages of the 
disease. 
On the other hand, this same hoof-and-mouth disease was dis-
covered in Australia in 1948. In this case, however, authorities were 
able to "catch" the disease before it had spread very far. Appropriate 
steps were taken by Australian health officials to wipe out the disease 
and there was very little loss in valuable livestock. Had this been an 
enemy attack designed to wipe out Australia's food supply, it would 
have been virtually ineffective. 
Destruction of a country's food crops may be a method employed 
by an enemy to reduce a cot1.ntry 1 s food supply and make it less able to 
maintain itself. In Mexico, several years ago, a severe blight took an 
enormous toll in the grain crops of that country, making it necessary 
to import vast quantities of grains. This weakened the financial and 
morale structures of Mexico irnmeasureably. Here, too, there is no evi-
dence that this was an enemy attack, but it could have been and as such 
it would have been extremely successful also. 
Australia has had little or no trouble with crop diseases al-
though instances of those diseases have been recorded many times. The 
Australians seemed to be able to "spot" disease sooner than did the 
Mexicans and were better able to prevent it from spreading. It seems 
quite likely that biological attacks against Australia's crops \-TOuld 
not be very successful in view of that country's past record of dealing 
with crop diseases and blights. 
So much for that aspect of biological warfare which is directed 
toward man's resources. 1.-Jhat is of even greater concern is biological 
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warfare that is directed against man himself. 
One kind of attack on man is that which is directed toward 
his water supply. In such attacks, an enemy might try to pollute a 
populations' water supply in order to immobilize and demoralize that 
population by afflicting it with disease, 
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A major disease which seems to be passed on to people through 
contaminated water is cholera, An inquiry into the incidenc e of this 
disease in the two countries leads to the conclusion that Australia is 
much better able to defend against biological attacks against its water 
supplies than is Mexico. The death rate due to cholera in Hexico in a 
year, for the past four years, has been 13% per year; that is, of all 
deaths in Hexico in a year, 13 out of every 100 have been due to cholera. 
In Australia, the figure for a comparable period is .10% or one tenth 
of one percent. 
All attacks on m&l using biological weapons rely on what is 
called the "natural spread11 of disease. Natural spread simply means 
that some germs are easily spread from one person to another; if you 
infect some people with a disease, it will spread to others. Thus, in 
the case of attacks on man's water supplies, an enemy's idea would be 
to start the disease in some people by polluting the water that those 
people drink and then Lope that the disease will spread from these 
people to others with whom they come in contact, r e sulting in wide-
spread epidemics. 
The implications of this natural spread of disease can be read-
ily appr eciated if we once again turn to the two countries we are us-
ing as examples. Cholera in Mexico wreaks havoc when an epidemic starts 
because of its fast spread. When the proper defenses are used, as in 
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Australia, it appears that the natural spread of this disease has 
little chance of success. 
Natural spread also pertains to diseases of animals. ~le have 
already seen the terrible damage wrought in Hexico by the hoof-and-
mouth disease, The tremendous loss of livestock attests to the effective-
ness of the natural spread process when it is not adequately defended 
against, 
It is important to remember that natural spread is the only 
way an enemy can hope to "blanket" a country with disease. There are no 
known \'lays o.f simultaneously hitting a whole population with a given 
disease. 
We've seen that Australia seems to have a consistently better 
record of defending against diseases than does Hexico. Let us look into 
some of the reasons for this. 
In Australia there exists an efficient system for inspecting 
and testing livestock throughout the country so that any incidence of 
disease or infection can be immediately determined. Also, meats are 
inspected after the animals have been slaughtered in order to prevent 
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contaminated meat from reaching the consumer. Australia'a medical re-
searchers have been developing new "defenses" in the form of serums 
which render animals immune from infection with the v:J.riou.s diseases 
an enemy might use. As soon as a disease is "spotted", all animals are 
innoculated with an appropriate serum. Also, an intensive program is 
devoted to the innoculation of livestock against possible diseases and 
the educa~ion of livestock breeders to the danger-signs of disease. 
In Mexico, until very recently, there was little in the way of 
systematic inspecting and testing of livestock and no inspection of 
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meats before they reached the buying public. Little has been done in 
Mexico in the way of medical research to develop immunizing serums for 
use on livestock, 
Insofar as food crops are concerned, the Australians have had 
for the past twenty years a program of crop inspection to determine 
when crops have been infected with a blight or disease. They also con-
duct regular crop spraying and dusting campaign:s as well as educational 
ca~paigns designed to teach farmers to recognize and treat various crop 
diseases. The effectiveness of this system of defense is attested to 
by the low rate of crop disease in Australia. 
Mexico, on the other hand, has done little in the way of crop 
inspection or spraying. For the first tirne,last year, it inaugurated 
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an educational program for farmers regarding crop care and early reports 
this year indicate that the program is having favorable effects even at 
this early date. 
To guard against contamination of their water supplies, the 
Australians have a rigorous inspection system v.rhereby water is chemi-
cally analyzed and tested continuously before and after it is purified. 
Using the most modern methods known to science, the public health 
technicians in Australia can detect extremely minute changes in the 
chemical conten-1:. of the water. Thus, they can detec.t any additive before 
the water reaches the consumer . 
Mexico has no system of water purification other than in its 
capital city, Mexico City. Even here, however, there is not the rigor-
ous inspection system that there is in Australia. That this inspection 
system makes a difference is seen by the previously mentioned figures 
of death rates due to cholera as well as comparable figures for other 
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disea ses transmitted through unpurified water. 
In regard to the natural spread method, the method which an 
enemy would hope would be most effective, research reveals that the 
Australians have a much more effecti ve system of defense than do the 
Mexicans . 
One of these defenses is simply the keeping of adec:uate records 
about the numbers of cases of the various couununicable di seases in a 
community. By watching the r ecords, it is possible to t ell when di seas e 
is on the upswing, whereupon other defenses can be brought i nto action. 
These other defenses include innoculations against the particular dis-
ease, quarantine of individuals carrying t he disease, and treatment of 
the disease victims ";ith appropriate medication. 
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Australia excels in all of these defenses. Her public health 
officials keep elaborat e records of communicable diseases and are able 
to tell immediately when there is an unusual incidence of disease. She 
has a souild program of innoculating children and adults against corrrrnuni-
c able diseases and her medical researche rs are constantly developing 
new preventive medicines . 
Mexico is just beginning to appreciate the value of public 
h ealth systems like Australia's and is pre sently setting up t he struc-
t1.J.re for a nation-wide system patterned somewhat after that of the U.S. 
She is also instituting a compulsory innoculation program against cer-
tain diseases and i s developing modern water purification plants in an 
effort to rid herself of the scourge of cholera. Her medical technology 
is rapidly impr oving; e .g., she is sending medical technicians to the 
U. S . for training in t he latest methods of medical science. 
There are, in addition, two more general defenses against 
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biological attack which seem to place Australia in a much better posi-
tion than Mexico. While these are not specific defenses against biolo-
gical warfare, they are vital parts of the total defense network that 
a country can put up against biological attack. The two "defenses" of 
which we speak are the communication and distribution systems of a 
country. An effective communication system is necessary in order to be 
able to reach the population with vital information concerning the bio-
logical attack so that proper precautions and remedial measures can be 
taken by the population. An effective distribution system is needed in 
order to insure that everyone gets treated with the proper medication. 
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In general, then, the country w:i.th the most advanced technology, 
with the most effective conununication system and with the most efficient 
distribution system is the one that is best able to resist biological 
attacks. Australia ( while not as highly developed as the U.S. in these 
respects) greatly overshadows Iviexico and should therefore be much more 
successful in resisting biological warfare directed against it. 
Most author:i_tie s indicate that, in t heir opinions, most people 
think of biological -vmrfare as a means of spreading new, fa.ntastically 
loathsome and indefensible diseases. These attacks would take the form 
of lethal and hitherto unknown diseases which could not be defended 
a gainst. 
These same authorities emphatically argue that, contrary to 
popular opinion, the kinds and effects of biological agents that might 
be used by an enemy are well known. They point out that inventing a 
new disease is not as easy as it sounds to untrained, unscientific ears. 
The major problem, they say, is not in defending against new, mysterious 
diseases but in defending against already known diseases. In fact, Dr. 
(explicit-credible) 
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Geoffre:Jr Rathbun of the Natural Science Research Council states that: 
It is doubtful whether science will ever be 
able to "manufacture" new kinds of bacteria. 
It may be that new bacteria will be discovered 
in the same sense that new physical elements 
such as radium were discovered. But as for 
"mystery" germs, that is sheer nonsense. 
\iJhether or not biological warfare is a 11 super 11 
weapon depends solely on whether Y~own diseases 
can be defended against when "planted" in a 
country by an enemy. We must not becloud the 
question with hysterical talk about mystery germs. 
It is time the cold facts were presented to the 
public. 
Here in this article, I have given you the "cold facts". On 
the basis of this information &"1d the generally accepted fact that the 
U.S. is even further advanc ed than Australia in its t echnical, scien-
tific and industrial development, a concerned public should now be able 
to arrive at the reasoned and sensible judgment that our country can 
defend itself very well against biological warfare; for us, therefore, 
it is not a"super" weapon. 




Geoffrey Rathbun of the Natural Science Research Council states that: 
It is doubtful whether science will ever be 
able to "manufacture" new kinds of bacteria, 
It may be that ne"l'r bacteria will be discovered 
in the same sense that new physical elements 
such as radium were discovered, But as for 
11 mystery11 germs, that is sheer nonsense. 
~Vhether or hot biological warfare is a 11 super" 
weapon depends solely on whether known diseas es 
can be defended against when "planted" in a 
country by an enemy. We must not becloud the 
question with hysterical talk about mystery germs . 
It is time the cold facts were presented to the 
public, 
Here in this article, I have given you the 11 cold facts". On the 
basis of this information and a knowledge of our country's technical, 
scientific and industrial resources, a concerned public should now be 
able to arrive at a r easoned and sensible estimate as to whether it 
should regard biological warfare as a 11 super 11 weapon. 
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73 





( contro 1 group) 
Division of Research 
Boston University 
Boston, Massachusetts 
CIVIL DEFENSE QUESTIOli.TNAIRE 
The following questions pertain to your attitudes and opllllons on topics 
which the various civil defense agencies are concerned with both on a 
local and national scale. This information will be of great value to the 
defense agencies. 
75 
The questionnaire is anonymous; your name is not requested, Please state 
your frank, honest ans1.vers. Answer all questions. If you are not sure of a 
certain response, sel ect the response which most closely expresses the v.ray 
you feel. 
l. In your op1n1on, will there be another Vvorld l·var within the next 50 
years ? (circle one) 
a. definitely yes 
b. probably yes 
c. don't know 
d. probably no 
e . definitely no 
2, vJhich of the following do you think is most dangerous insofar as the 
civilian population is concernod ? (circle one) 
a . chemical warfare 
b. atomic warfare 
c. biological warfare 
d. psychological warfare 
e. hydrogen warfare 
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3. In your opinion, what are the chances of a person surviving a biological 
attack on the United States ? (circle one) 
a. very good 
b. good 
c. fairly good 
d, 50-50 
e. fairly poor 
f. poor 
g. very poor 
4, Against which type of attack do you think a civil defense organization 
can be most effective ? (circle one) 
a. atomic attack 
b. chemical attack 
c. biological attack 
d. hydrogen attack 
e. psychologic al attack 
5. Some people feel thEJ.t the U.S. should continue to develop bigger and 
more powerful hydrogen bombs; other people feel that we should not. 
How do you fe el about it ? 
3 
6. In your opinion, is biological warfare a "super" weapon as far as the 
United States is concerned ? ( circle one) 
a. definit ely yes 
b. probably yes 
c. uncertain 
d. probably not 
e. definitely not 
7. \Jhat is your definition of 11 super" weapon ? 
8. As f ar as you know, has chemical wnrfare ever been used by one coun-
try against another ? (circle one ) 
a . yus 
b. no 
c. uncertain 
9. Hhat kind of job do you think the civil def ense agencies are doing in 
protecting people against the r esults of possible enemy attacks ? 
(circle one) 
a. excellent job 
b. very good job 
c. good job 
d. f air job 
e. poor job 
f. very poor job 
g. extremely poor job 
11 
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10. How much protection can an individual have from germs and other 
products of biological war fare ? ( cir~le on•;;) 
a. 100% 
b. about 8C}j& 
c. about 60/o 
d. about 50% 
e. about 40% 
f. about 20% 
g. no protection at all 
ll. How important a part do you think the civil defense agencies play in 
the dei ense of our country ? 
a. very important 
b. important 
c. don't know 
d. unimportant 
e, very unimportant 
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l~. How important is the topic of biological warfare to you ? (circl{ one, 
a. extremely important 
b . ver-y important 
c, somewhat important 
d. uncertain 
e. somewhat unimportant 
f . very unimportant 
go extremely unimportant 
5 
13. To what exte -.+, wc.,uld the outle.W::._ng of u:'::.omj:: and h~rdrogen wa.rfa.~ o. 
make you f eel more P>ecure ? (circle ·.Jr1e) 
a. to E. very great exteni; 
b. to a great extent 
c. to a medium ext ent 
d . to a small extent 
e. to a very small extent 
:h, !n your opinion, to v-rhat extent can biologi cal warfare tt- du~er. de(.:. 
against ? (circle one) 
a . COl'lpletely 
b. to a very great extent 
c. to a great extent 
d. to a medium E2xtent 
e . b e. small extent 
f. to a very small extent 
g - not at all 
i5. Do you "Worry quit e a bit over the possibili'..:.y of another 1,.,r3.r ·) 
r:cil·cle O!le) 
a. yes 
b . no 
16. Does the mere thought of large scal e germ v'k.rfare make you u11.eas:r ? 
(circ le one) 




17. Do you feel that the civil defense ag<mcies are doing all they can 
to prepare for possible attack ? (circle one) 
a. yes 
b. no 
c. don't know 




If you do, please describe them briefly: 
Now, for statistical purposes, can you tell us a little about yourself ? 
20. Sex: male 21. Veteran ? __ yes 
female no 
22. Date of birth: 
Honth ·-------:~·----Day Year 
23. Father's occupation: ___________ _ 
-.. --- - - ---
24. Is your father a veteran ? ___ yes 
no 
25. Are you a member of a civil defense organization? __ yes 
no 







PlEASE DO NOT OPEN THIS BOOKLET UNTIL YOU ARE TOLD TO DO SO 
OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE 
DIVISION OF RESEARCH 
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
1. What was the main position that the author expressed in his 
article ? 
2. How obvious was he in expressing his position ? (circle one) 
a. extremely obvious 
b. very obvious 
c. somewhat obvious 
d. not very obvious 
e. not at all obvious 
3. Do you think the author of the article was fair in his presenta-
tion of the facts, or did he write a one-sided r eport ? (circle one) 
a. completely fair 
b. mostly fair 
c. half fair, half one-sided 
d. mostly one~sided 
e. completely one-sided 
4. Did you learn anything from this article that you did not know 
before ? (circle one) 
a. learned a great deal new 
b. learned a number .of new facts 
c. learned very little new 
d~ learned nothing new 
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5. Did you find the article interesting or dull ? (circle one) 
a. very interesting 
b. fairly interesting 
c. neither interesting or uninteresting 
d. fairly dull 
e. very dull 
6. Do you think this article should be considered as a piece of 
npropaganda11 ? (circle ope) 
a. yes 
b. no 
c • don 1 t knm-1 
7. How would you rate the quality of wrj_ting of this article? 
(circle one) 
a. very good 
b. pretty good 
c. neither good nor poor 
d. pretty poor 
e. very poor 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
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Now we would like your own opinions on the topic of biological warfare. 
8. In your opinion what are the chances of a person surviving a 
biological attack on the United States ? (circle one) 
a. very good 
b. good 
c. fairly good 
d. 50-50 
e. fairly poor 
f. poor 
g. very poor 
9. How much protection can an individual have from germs and other 
products of biological warfare ? ( circle one) 
a. lO<::t% protection 
b. about 80% 
c. about 60% 
d. about 50% 
e. about 40% 
f. about 20% 
g. no protection at all 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
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10. In your opinion to what extent can biological warfare be defended 
against by the United States ? (circle one) 
a. completely 
b. to a very great extent 
c. to a great extent 
d. to a medium extent 
e. to a small extent 
.f. to a very small extent 
g. not at all 
ll. In your op1n1on is biological warfare a 11 super" weapon as far 
as the United States is concerned ? ( circle one) 
a. definitely ·yes 
b. probably yes 
c. uncertain 
d. probably not 
e. definitely not 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
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Now we would like to find out how well you remember some of the 
specific details of the article you have just read. Circle the one 
alternative which is correct according to the information presented 
in the article. 
12. How many kinds of biological warfare did the author say there 





13. VJhat disease did the author speak of as being passed on to people . 




d. scarlet fever 
14. Which one of the following conclusions did the author come to 
in his article ? (circle one) 
a. advanced technology and efficient communication and distri-
bution systems are necessary to defend against biological 
warfare. 
b. the United States should not regard biological warfare as 
a "super" weapon since it can defend itself against it. 
c. Mexico cannot adequately defend itself against biological 
warfare, but Australia can do so effectively. 
d. the author came to no definite conclusion; he left the 
conclusion up to the reader. 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEX:T PAGE 
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15. The author quoted Dr. Geoffrey Rathbun as saying which of the 
following statements ? (circle one) 
a. science is constantly developing new kinds of germs. 
b. it is doubtful whether science will ever be able to manu-
facture new kinds of bacteria. 
c. what we have to fear most from biological attack is that 
it might be made with ne, . .,r kinds of germs unknown to our 
scientists. 
d. it is impossible to develop vaccines for use against many 
of the germs that are k~own to man. 
16. Which of the following did the author state as being his purpose 
in writing the article ? (circle one) 
a. to try to determL~e whether or not we in the United States 
should regard biological warfare as a super weapon. 
b. to compare two geographically diverse countries to see to 
what extent each could defend against biological warfare. 
c. to sho;.T the necessity of preventing the use of biological 
warfare in the event of another war. 
d. to define biological warfare and show the various ways it 
could be used against a country by an enemy. 
17. Which of the following statements did the author make ? (circle one) 
a. the country with the most diversified industry and the most 
plentiful natural resources is best able to resist biologi-
cal attacks. 
b. the country with the largest geographical area is best able 
to resist biological attacks. 
c, the country with the most effective defenses against air 
attacks is best able to resist biological attacks. 
d. the country with the most technical advancement and the most 
effective conmunication and distribution systems is best 
able to resist biological attacks. 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
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18. ~my did the author reject the use of toxins· as a method of 
biological attack ? (circle one) 
· a. because toxins cannot spread themselves and would, there-
fore, affect only very limited numbers of people, 
b. because toxins are not really biological; they are more 
appropriately classified as chemical warfare. 
c. because toxins are so easily defended against that it is 
not necessary to devote any time to discussing them, 
d. because toxins cannot be produced in large enough quantities 
to be used in large scale biological attacks. 
19. What was the name of the newspaper in which the article you just 
read appeared ? (Write name of paper below) 
Personal Data 
The following information will be helpful in comparing your responses 
with students like yourselves at other colleges and universities. 
l. Have you ever had .any journalism courses in high school or in 
college ? 
__ yes no 
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2. Sex: ___ _ 3. Intended occupation~--------------------
4. What kind of work does your father do ? ________________________ _ 
5. Date of your birth:--,-,-----,-----
month day 
?. Have you ever worked on a newspaper 










Through an oversight , the following questions were omitted from the main 
questionn,).:~ re. Since the ansNers to them are important to us, please 
ansv-rer th·.'; ,, with the same sincerity and frankne s s that you used in 
answering -:~ he pr· ~ c eding questions. 
20. How (: / cernorl_ are ;•'·)"J. abr."L:.t biologica :::.. warf<.;.r e ? (circle one) 
a. e:->:.tremel;r concerned 
b. vc:l y concerned 
c. s u:re•-rha j.:. concern8d 
d. w.1certai n 
e-, so:Lewhat u:J.con~erned 
g. ext ::'·3mel~ unco1-:..cer ned 
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21. How important is the to ~Jic of biological warfa re to you ? (circle one) 
a. extremely important 
b. very i mpcrt ant 
c. somewhat i mport ant 
d. uncerta in 
e . somewhat unimportant 
f. very unimportant 
g. extremely unimportant 
22. Do you worry quite a bit over the possibility of anothe r war ? (eircle 
one) 
a. y c:; s 
b. no 
23. Does the m0re thought of l a rge scale germ warfare make you w.1easy ? 
(circle one) 





( contro 1 group) 
Division of Research 
Boston University 
Boston, Massachusetts 
CIVIL DEFENSE QUESTIONNAIRE 
A few weeks ago you completed a questionnaire for the Civil Defense 
Agencies which asked for your opinions on a number of topics with which 
these agencies are concerned. 
In addition to being interested in opinions and attitudes as such, the 
91 
Civil Defense Agencies are also interested in what happens to th8se opinions 
over a period of time. We are asking your cooperation, therefore , in 
helping us to find some answers to this question and would like to have 
you fill out the following questionnaire which is similar to the one you 
previously filled out. 
The questionnaire is anonymous; your name is not requested. Please state 
your frank, honest answers. Answer all questions. If you are not sure of 
a certain response, select the response which n1ost closely expresses the 
way you feel. 
1. In your opinion, vnll there be another war within the next 50 years 1 
(circle one) 
a. definitely yes 
b. probably ~res 
c. don 't knovv 
d. probably no 
e . definitely no 
2. Which of the following do you think is most dangerous insofar as the 
civilian population is concerned ? ( circle one) 
a. chemical warfare 
b. atomic warfare 
c. biolofical warfare 
d. psychological warfare 
e. hydrogen warfare 
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3. In your opinion, what are the chances of a person surviving a biological 
attack on the United States ? (circle one) 
a. very good 
b, good 
c. fairly good 
d. 50-50 
e . fairly poor 
f. poor 
g. very poor 
4. Against which type of attack do you think a civil defens e organization 
can be most effective ? (cir cle one) 
a. atomic attack 
b. chemical attack 
c. biologic al attGck 
d. hydrogen attack 
e. psychologic al attack 
5. Some people feel that the U. S . should continue to develop bigger and 
more powerful hydrogen bombs; other people f ee l that we should not. 
How do you f eel about it ? 
3 
6. In your opinion, is biological warfar e a "super" weapon as far as the 
United States is concerned ? ( circle one) 
a . definitely yes 
b . probably yes 
c . uncertain 
d; probabl y not 
e; definitely not 
7 . Vhat i s your defi nition of "super" weapon ? 
8 . As far as you know, has chemical wc.rft.'.r e eve r been used by one coun-
try against another ? (circlu one) 
a~ ye s 
b . no 
c . unc ertain 
9 . \'Jha t kind of job do you think the civil defense agenc ies are doing in 
protecting people against the results of possi ble enemy attacks ? 
(circle one) 
a. excellent job 
b . very good job 
c . good job 
d . fair job 
e . poor job 
f. very poor job 
g . extremely poor job 
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10. How much protection can an individual have from germs and other 
products of biological warfare ? (circle one) 
a. 100% 
b. about 8076 
c. about 6CJ/o 
d. about 50% 
e. about 4Cf/o 
f. about 20% 
g . no protection at all 
ll. How important a part do you think the civil defense agencies play in 
the defense of our colli~try ? 
a. very important 
b. important 
c, don't knmv 
d. unimportant 
e. very unimportant 
94 
12. How important is the topic of biological warfare to you ~ (circle one) 
a . extremely important 
b. very important 
c. somewhat important 
d, uncertain 
e. somewhat unimportant 
f. very unimportant 
g. extremely unimportant 
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13. To what extent would the outlawing of atowic and hydrogen warfare 
make you feel more secure ? (circle one) 
a. to a very great extent 
b. to a great extent 
c. to a medium extent 
d. to a small extent 
e. to a very small extent 
14. In your oplnlon, to what extent can biological warfare be defended 
against ? (circle one) 
a. completely 
b. to a very great extent 
c. to a great extent 
d. to a medium extent 
e. to a small extent 
f. to a very small extent 
g •. not at all 










17. Do you feel tha t the civil defense agencies are doing all they can 
to prepare for possible attack? (circle one) 
a . yes 
b. no 
c. don 1 t k.>1ow 
18. Since completing the previous ques tionnaire h&ve you s een, heard or 
r ead anything about atornic warfare ? If you have please t ell us about 
it briefly below: 
19. Since cornpl eting the previous questionnaire have you seen, heard or 
r ead anything about biological warfare ? I f you have , pl ease t ell us 
about it belovv: 
Now, for statis tical purposes, can you tell us a little a "b out yourself ? 
20. Sex : 
----
22. Date of birth: 
21. Vet eran ? __ yes 
no 
----~~-----~-------~-----month Day Year 
23. Father ' s occupation: ________________________ __ 






Division of Research 
Boston University 
A few weeks ago you participated in a study carried out for th~ 
American Society for Education in Mass Media by the Divisirm of 
Research at Boston University. 
At that time, a copy of a nevrspaper article was given to you. 
After reading it, you were asked questions about the article in 
order to find out how well you learned from it. 
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The American Society for Education in Mass Media is also interest-3d 
in how well people remember what they have read after a period of tir>:e . 
In order to get some informat i on regarding this, we are asking your 
cooperation in completing t he following ques tionnaire which pertains 
to the article you r ead some weeks ago. 
Opinion Questionnaire 
Division of Research 
Boston University 
l. ltv'hat v-ras the main position that the author expressed in his 
article ? 
2. How obvious was he in expressing his position ? (circle one) 
a. extremely obvious 
b. very obvious 
c. somewhat obvious 
d. not very obvious 
e. not at all obvious 
3. Do you think the author of the article was fair in his presenta-
tion of the facts, or did he write a one-sided report ? (circle one) 
a. completely fair 
b. mostly fair 
c. half fair, half one-sided 
d. mostly one-sided 
e. completely one-sided 
4. Did you learn anything from this article that you did not know 
before ? (circle one) 
a. learned a great deal new 
b. learned a number of new facts 
c. learned very little new 
d. learned nothing new 
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5. Did you find the article interesting or dull ? (circle one) 
a. very interesting 
b. fairly interesting 
c. neither interesting or uninteresting 
d. fairly dull 
e. very dull 
6. Do you think this article should be considered as a piece of 
"propaganda" ? (circle ope) 
a. yes 
b. no 
c. don't know 
?. How would you rate the quality of writing of this article? 
(circle one) 
a. very good 
b. pretty good 
c. neither good nor poor 
d. pretty poor 
e. very poor 




Now we would like zour own opinions on the topic of biological warfare. 
8. In your opinion what are the chances of a person surviving a 
biological attack on the United States ? (circle one) 
a. very good 
b. good 
c. fairly good 
d. 50-50 
e. fairly poor 
f. poor 
g. very poor 
9. How much protection can an individual have from germs and other 
products of biological warfare ? (circle one) 
a • 100% protection 
. 
b. about 80% 
c. about 60% 
d. about 50% 
e .• about 407'o 
f. about 20% 
g. no protection at all 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
4 
10. In your opinion to what extent can biological warfare be defended 
against by theUnited States? (circle one) 
a. completely 
b, to a. very great extent 
c. to a great extent 
d. to a medium extent 
e. to a small extent 
.f. to a very small extent 
g. not at all 
ll. In your oplllJ.on is biological warfare a 11 super 11 weapon as far 
as the United States is conc erned '? ( circle one) 
a. definitely ·yes 
b. probably yes 
c. uncertain 
d. probably not 
e. definitely not 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
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Now we would like to find out how well you remember some of the 
specific details of the article you have just read. Circle the one 
alternative which is correct according to the information presented 
in the article. 
12. How many kinds of biological warfare did the author say there 





13. What disease did the author speak of as being passed on to people . 




d. scarlet fever 
14. Which one of the following conclusions did the author come to 
in his article ? (circle one) 
a. advanced technology and efficient communication and distri-
bution systems are necessary to defend against biological 
warfare. 
b. the United States should not regard biological warfare as 
a 11 super11 weapon since it can defend itself against it. 
c. Mexico cannot adequately defend itself against biological 
warfare, but Australia can do so effectively. 
d. the author came to no definite conclusion; he left the 
conclusion up to the reader. 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
102. 
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15. The author quoted Dr. Geoffrey Rathbun as saying which of the 
following statements ? (circle one) 
a. science is constantly developing new kinds of germs. 
b. it is doubtful whether scienc e will ever be able to manu-
fac t ure new kinds of bacteria. 
c. what we have to fear most from biological attack is that 
it might be made with ne,.v kinds of germs unknown to our 
scientists. 
d. it is impossible to develop vaccines for us e ago.inst many 
of the germs that are known to man. 
16. Which of the following did the author state as being his purpose 
in writing the article ? (circle one ) 
a. to try to deterrrine vlhe ther or not we in the United States 
should regard biological warfare as a super weapon. 
b. to compare tv;o geographically diverse countrie s to see t o 
what extent each could defend agai nst biological warfare. 
c. to show the necessity of preventing the use of biological 
warfare in the event of ru10ther war. 
d. to define biological warfare and show the various ways it 
could be used against a country by an enemy. 
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17. Which of the following statements did the author make ? (circle one) 
a. the country with the most diversified industry and the most 
plentiful natural resources is best able to re sist biologi-
cal attacks. 
b. the country with the largest geographical area is best able 
to resist biological attacks. 
c. the country with the most effective defenses against air 
attacks is best able to r esist biological attacks. 
d. the country with the most technical advanc ement and the most 
effective communication and distribution systems is best 
able to r esis t biological attacks. 
PLEASE GO ON TO NEXT PAGE 
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18. Why did the author reject the use of toxins as a method of biological 
attack ? (circle one) 
a. because toxins cannot spread themselves and would, therefore, 
affe ct only very limited numbers of people . 
b. because t oxins are not really biological; they are more appropria-
tely class ified as chemical warfare . 
c. because toxins are so easily defended against that it is not 
necessary to devote any time to discussing them. 
d. because toxins cannot be produced in large enough quantities to 
be used in large scale biological attacks . 
19. What was the name of the newspaper in which the article you read a few 
weeks ago appeared ? (Write name of paper below) 
20. How concerned are you about biological warfare ? (circle one) 
a. ext remel y concerned 
b. very concerned 
c . somewhat concerned 
d. uncertain 
e. somewhat unconcerned 
f. very unconcerned 
g . extremely unconcerned 
21. Do you ·worry quite a bit over the possibility of another war ? (circle 
one) 





22 . How important is the topic of biological vvarfare to you ? (circle one ) 
a . extremely i mportant 
b. very important 
c. somewhat important 
d. uncertain 
e . somewhat unimportant 
f. very unimportant 
g. extremely unimportant 
23 . Does the mere thought of large scale germ vrarfare make you uneasy ? 
(circl e one) 
a . yes 
b . no 
24. Have you seen , heard or r ead anything about biological warfare since 
you read the article ? If you have, please tell us briefly about it 
below: 
Personal Data 
The following information will be helpful in comparing your r espons es 
with students like yourselves at other col leges and universities . 
l. Have you ever had any journalism courses in high school or college ? 
__ yes no 
2. Sex: 
---
3. Intended occupation : 
----------------------------
4. Father's occupation : 
---------------------
5. Class : Freshman 
--Sophmore 
Junior 





6. Have you ever worked on a newspaper, either a t school or outside ? 
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The study focusses on the complexity of the opinion change pro-
cess and investigates the simple and interactive effects of three 
variables relating to it---conclusion-drawing, communicator credibi-
lity, and audience predisposition. 
Hovland and Mandell found that a communication with the conclusion 
stated explicitly was more effective in changing opinions than an identi-
cal communication with no explicit statement of the conclusion. However, 
they offered no explanation of this finding. Thistlethwaite, de Haan 
and Kamenetzky suggested that the greater opinion change might have 
been associated with the explicit communication primarily because it 
produced superior comprehension of the communicator's position. They 
demonstrated experimentally that the explicit communication produces 
superior comprehension of the communicator's position but found no 
opinion change differences between the explicit and non-explicit groups. 
Their implication that comprehension is related to opinion change was 
not, however, directly tested. 
Besides a re-examination of the effectiveness of conclusion-dr$.wing, 
a second purpose of this research is to consider the relationship be-
tween communicator-credibility and conclusion-drawing. Hovland and 
Mandell found no interaction between credibility and explicitness. 
Furthermore, they found no differences in opinion change between the 
credible and non-credible groups. However, they did not consider their 
induction of the credibility variable to be particularly potent. 
Initial position and manifest anxiety as predispositional factors 
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interacting with conclusion-drawing and source credibilitF are also 
examined. Both ha~e been shown to be important in the opinion change 
process. 
The following assumptions were made: 
1. The greater the discrepancy between the Ss position and the 
communicator's position, the greater will be the Ss resistance 
to opinion change. 
2. The more clearly stated the communicator's position is, the more 
obvious the discrepancy between the S and the communicator will be. 
a. The more clearly stated the communicator's position is, 
the more obvious should be his attempt to persuade the 
S to adopt a particular position. 
The following hypotheses were formulated: 
l.a. In the non-credible condition, the non-explicit communication 
will be more effective than the explicit in changing opinions. 
b. In the credible condition, the explicit communication will be 
more effective than the non-explicit. 
2.a. Ss initially opposed to the conmunicator's position will be 
more influenced by the non-explicit communication than by the 
explicit. 
b. Ss initially favorable toward the communicator's position will 
be more influenced by the explicit communication than by the 
non-explicit. 
3. Ss who are high in anxiety will be more likely to accept an 
anxiety-allaying communication than will Ss who are low in 
anxiety. 
4.a. For high anxious Sa, the explicit treatment will be more effect-
ive than the non-expJicit. 
b. Thr low anxious Ss, the explicit treatment will be more effective 
than the non-explicit. 
c. The effect of explicitness will be greater hr the high anxious 
Ss than for the low anxious Ss. 
Delayed effe cts of t he above variables were also examined. 
A before---immediate-after---delayed-after design was employed. 
The before questionnaire contained opinion items, filler items, and 
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two anxiety-assessing inventories. Three weeks later all Ss read an 
article on biological warfare which proposed that biological warfare 
was not a "super" weapon; the United States could defend against it. 
One half of the Ss read a version stating this proposition explicitly 
as the appropriate conclusion; the other half read a version without 
any explicit statement of the conclusion. For one half of each group, 
the authorship of the article was attributed to a credible source and 
for the other half to a non-credible source. Immediately after reading 
the article, the Ss completed another questionnaire containing opinion 
questions and relevant judgmental and informational items. Six weeks 
later all Ss filled out an identical questionnaire. A control group, 
not exposed to the communication but responding to the questionnaires, 
was also employed. 
Subjects were approximately 400 students at American International 
College, Springfield, Massachusetts. 
The experimental groups all showed significantly greater opinion 
change than the control group. The groups did not differ initially. 
The explicit group showed greater opinion change than the non-
explicit group. No difference was found between the credible and non-
credible conditions. 
Hypothesis 1-a was not substantiated; within the non-credible 
condition, no difference was found between explicit and non-explicit 
treatments. Hypothesis 1-b was verified; with a credible communicator, 
the explicit treatment was more effective than the non-explicit. 
Hypothesis 2-a was not verified; for Ss initially unfavorable to 
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the communicator's position, no difference was found between explicit 
and non-explicit treatments. Hypothesis 2-b was substantiated; for Ss 
initially favorable to the communicator's position, the explicit treat-
ment was more effective than the non-explicit. 
Hypothesis 3 was verified; high anxious Ss were changed more than 
low anxious Ss. 
Hypothesis 4-a was not substantiated; no differences were found 
between the explicit and non-explicit treatments for high anxious Ss. 
Hypothesis 4-b was substantiated; for Ss low in anxiety the explicit 
treatment was more effective than the non-explicit. Hypothesis 4-c 
was not substantiated; the effect of explicitness was not greater for 
the high anxious Ss than for the low anxious Ss. 
When the data were examined in terms of comprehension and acceptance, 
it was found that more Ss in the explicit condition comprehended the 
communicator's position. However, no relationship between knowledge of 
the communicator's position and opinion change was found. 
Ss indicating high concern about the topic after reading the communi-
cation changed significantly ~ess in opinion than Ss indicating low con-
cern. Ss in the non-explicit treatment were more likely than Ss in the 
explicit treatment to say that biological warfare was of concern to them. 
At the delayed-after time period, all groups were still signifi-
cantly different from the control group. There were no significant 
differences between experimental groups. The opinion change differ-
ences between high and low anxious Ss was no longer present. The finding 
that Ss showing high concern changed less in opinion than Ss showing 
low concern was still evident. However, there was no difference between 
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the explicit and non-explicit groups in the proportion of Ss indicat-
ing high concern. 
The finding of no relationship between knowledge of the communi-
cator's position and opinion change was discussed. A conce ption of 
opinion change as an on-going process which starts as the S commences 
reading the communication and during which the S is exposed to many 
cues as to the direction of the communication was pre11ented. From these 
cues, it was posited that the S obtains an over-all impression or 
"feeling tone 11 regarding the direction of the communication and the 
intent of the communicator. This has an effect on acceptance apparently 
as great as when the S has specific knowledge in addition to this 
"feeling tone". 
To account for the finding that the explicit treatment is more 
effective than the non-explicit the formulation was advanced that, in 
addition to making the communicator's position clearer, the explicit 
treatment serves the purpose of tying together the content of the 
communication into a meaningful whole. In the explicit condition, upon 
reading the conclusion the S is better able to see how the preceding 
material related to the basic message. The impact of this 11unified 11 
and better understood communication should be greater than in the non-
explicit condition where the S has no referent for the conclusion he 
has drawn and is likely to be uncertain of it, which should reduce the 
over-all impact of the communication. 
While no measure of uncertainty was included, it would be expected 
that with uncertainty and a communication that deals with a potentially 
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aniiety-arousing topic, somewhat greater residual concern would be 
evi dent than where certainty prevailed. The results indicate that the 
Ss in the non-explicit condition showed more concern than the Ss in 
the explicit condition. Furthermore, the aroused concern was found to 
manifest itself in an apparent restriction of opinion change. Thus, 
the explicit treatment, with fewer Ss who were highly concerned, was 
found to show greater change than then non-explict. 
Given a non-credible source, it had been expected that the non-
explicit treatment would be more effective than the explicit since 
it served to minimize the manipulative intent of the source. However, 
the uncertainty which accompanies the non-explicit treatment apparently 
counteracts the positive effect of minimizing manipulative intent of 
the source and the resultant conflict of "forces" possibly leads to 
the lack of difference between the explicit and non-explicit treatments. 
The "conflict" does not obtain with a credible communicator. 
The results for initial position were possibly complicated by the 
generally favorable initial opinions of all Ss; the so-calledu~favor­
ables" were initially towards the center of the theoretical di atribu-
tion of favorability. In addition, when an s•s opinion is greatly 
discrepant from that of the communicator, the S should have a good 
idea of the sense of the communi cation. Thus, with a cogent communica-
tion, it might be expected that explicitness would not differentially 
effect those initially unfavorable. But when the S is not very dis-
crepant from the communicator, he is less likely to sense the precise 
position suggested by the general tenor of the communication. Thus, it 
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might be expected that an explicit statement of the appropriate con-
clusion would result in greater opinion change for the initially 
favorable Ss than would no explicit statement. 
The anxiety results are interpreted as supporting a congruency 
conceptualization which deals with anxiety as a response predisposi-
tion and considers the viewpoint of the communication in relation to 
that predisposition. The lack of predicted results for the high anxious 
Ss may be due to the strong motive to accept in the high anxious Ss 
overcoming the factor of lessened certainty in the non-explicit condi-
tion. 
Over-all, the results are interpreted as supporting the initial 
contention regarding the complexity of the communication process. 
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